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Too often in our litigious society, individuals bring law suits
that are similar to, but not the same as, previously litigated disputes.
Rather than hear these suits; courts occasionally preclude them by
developing novel exceptions to the established limitations of res
judicatal law. The influential Restatement (Second) ofJudgments2 (the
"Second Restatement ") consistently implies that there are circum-
stances when this kind of innovative "exception to a limitation" is
proper, even in the context of some of the most firmly established
limitations in the law of preclusion.5 This view allows a court to
invoke res judicata whenever it has good reason to conclude that a
party's action in a prior suit forfeits his right to a second day in
court.
Preclusion, however, is only justified when it is foreseeable.
This principle has been recognized since Judge Learned Hand's dis-
cussion of foreseeablity in The Evergreens v. Nunan,4 .in which he
argued:
1 This Note follows the modern trend in resjudicata terminology set forth by the
Supreme Court in Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1
(1984):
The preclusive effects of former adjudication ... are referred to collec-
tively by most commentators as the doctrine of "res judicata." [Citations
omitted]. Resjudicata is often analyzed further to consist of two preclu-
sion concepts: "issue preclusion" and "claim preclusion." Issue predu-
sion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of a
matter that has been litigated and decided. See Restatement [(Second) of
Judgments] § 27. This effect also is referred to as direct or collateral es-
toppel. Claim preclusion refers to the effect of ajudgment in foreclosing
litigation of a matter that never has been litigated, because of a determi-
nation that it should have been advanced in an earlier suit. Claim pre-
clusion therefore encompasses the law of merger and bar. See i&,
Introductory Note before § 24.
See also 18 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 &
n.2 (1981) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER].
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1980).
3 See infra Part III.
4 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944). The case involved a tax
dispute in which the taxpayer sought to require that facts tangentially found in a prior
proceeding be used to calculate his present tax liability. While the court declined to
announce a general policy against using issue preclusion when its invocation would not
be foreseeable, it announced a doctrine which would only apply preclusion to matters
that were "ultimate facts" in the prior proceeding, not to mere "mediate data." Because
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Whatjural relevance facts may acquire in the future it is often im-
possible even remotely to anticipate. Were the law to be recast, it
would therefore be a pertinent inquiry whether the conclusiveness
... of facts decided in the first, might not properly be limited to
future controversies which could be thought reasonably in pros-
pect when the first suit was tried. That is of course not the law as
it stands .... 5
Evergreens established the principle that parties may relitigate tan-
gential issues if they could not foresee the issues' subsequent impor-
tance at the time of the first suit. Judge Hand's suggestion was
accepted by the Supreme Court6 and by the Second Restatement, which
added that the suggestion might apply, for example, when the gov-
erning substantive law unforeseeably changes.7
While the Second Restatement seems to treat unforeseeable pre-
clusion differently, depending on whether it results from a change in
the substantive law or from an innovation in the law of res judicata,
the principle of Evergreens should apply to both cases. Resjudicata is
a harsh doctrine, which deprives the precluded party of even an op-
portunity to be heard on the merits of the case. Consequently, pre-
clusion is only justified when it advances important policies of the
court system, such as lowering litigation costs or allowing successful
litigants a sense of repose. These and other benefits of res judicata
are based on the prospect of future preclusion affecting the behav-
ior of both the parties and future litigants. When preclusion is un-
foreseeable, it cannot influence the actions of anyone and, worse,
causes confusion that is counterproductive. Thus, resjudicata has a
particular need for clear, well-known rules.
As in any area of law, the number of circumstances in which
preclusion issues can arise is virtually limitless. It is therefore im-
possible for the framers of res judicata law to develop clear rules
the court found that the matters sought to be precluded in this case were mediate data, it
refused to invoke preclusion.
5 Id at 929. While Judge Hand's suggestion concerning foreseeability was not
widely accepted at the time, the American Law Institute agreed that "mediate data"
were not proper subjects of issue preclusion and inserted the concept into the first Re-
statement of Judgments in a rare amendment in 1948. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68
cmt. p (1942).
6 Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).
7 Section 28(5) of the Second Restatement states that issue preclusion is not applica-
ble if "[t]here is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue...
because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue
would arise in the context of a subsequent action." Comment i to that section adds:
preclusion should not operate to foreclose redetermination of an issue if
it was unforeseeable when the first action was litigated that the issue
would arise in the context of the second action, and if that lack of foresee-




that will foreseeably apply preclusion whenever it would be useful to
do so. The best that can be done, within the constraint of foresee-
ability, is to have clear rules that apply to a subset of the circum-
stances when preclusion, if foreseeable, would bejustified. In other
words, the rules of preclusion must be underinclusive.
This Note argues that the Second Restatement's decision to distin-
guish between unforeseeable preclusion caused by changes in sub-
stantive law and that caused by changes in the law of res judicata is
untenable. Unforeseeable preclusion, whatever its cause, is incon-
sistent with the policies underlying resjudicata. Part I discusses the
basic themes of modem res judicata law, as reflected in the Second
Restatement. Part II discusses the policies underlying resjudicata and
argues that they are only furthered when preclusion is foreseeable.
Part III uses the Second Restatement as an example, surveying the invi-
tations to unforeseeable preclusion it contains and arguing that
cases employing the logic reflected in those invitations havebeen
result-oriented and have caused unacceptable confusion in the law
of res judicata.
I
BASIC THEMES OF THE RESTATEMENT
In the first attempt to codify the law of preclusion, the Restate-
ment of Judgments8 (the "First Restatement") reflected the prevailing
legal environment of its time, under which litigants had quasi-
proprietary procedural "rights" that could not be denied because of
pragmatic considerations. 9 Thus, the drafters of the First Restatement
sought to provide clear definitions of the circumstances under which
a party was to be precluded from litigating a claim or an issue.' 0
Rather than providing clarity, however, these definitions tended
merely to beg the question. For instance, the First Restatement stated
that claim preclusion (which it called "merger" and "bar") results
8 RESTATEMENT OFJUDGMENTS (1942).
9 MauriceJ. Holland, Modernizing ResJudicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine, 55
IND. LJ. 615, 620 (1980). The view of procedural rights as a form of property is also
reflected in other contemporaneous legal works such as the original 1937 provisions on
joinder in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
v. Lumbermen Mut. Casualty, 365 F.2d 802, 805 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc), vacated sub
nom. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968); RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICr OF LAWS (1934). See Holland, supra, at 618-20.
10 One commentator described the First Restatement as providing "a lucid analysis of
the principles of res judicata by making sharp distinctions among the various concepts
embodied in this area of the law and by establishing a precise system of terminology, the
lack of which previously had impeded consistent treatment of the problems involved."
Note, Developments in the Law-ResJudicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 822 (1952) [hereinafter
Note, Developments in the Law].
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from a judgment that is "on the merits."'I It defined "on the mer-
its," in turn, as ajudgment based "on rules of substantive law,"' 2 as
opposed to a judgment that is "based merely on rules of proce-
dure."' 3 As any student of Erie doctrine' 4 knows, this distinction is
far from clear. 15 Similarly, the First Restatement attempted to clarify
the scope of a claim by defining it to include all causes of action
arising from the "same transaction."1 6 However, as Professor
Wright has observed concerning a similar definition of "claim," it
"is probably sound enough, but it shows the futility of all defini-
tions: after studying the definition we have no more idea whether a
particular [claim is precluded] than we had before we started."' 7
The more recent Second Restatement takes a nearly opposite ap-
proach from that used by the authors of the First Restatement. It re-
jects as hopeless the attempt to provide clear rules applicable to all
preclusion questions.' 8 Instead, it recognizes that courts must apply
some difficult concepts, such as the dimension of a claim, pragmati-
cally with reference to a series of factors.' 9 This new philosophy
11 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942).
12 Id. cmt. a.
13 L This distinction is further explained in an equally unhelpful passage: "If the
judgment determines that the plaintiff has no cause of action, it is on the merits; but if it
determines only that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in the particular action, it is
not on the merits." Id
14 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (attempting to reconcile the Supreme
Court's conflicting rulings on Erie doctrine).
16 RESTATEMENT OFJUDGMENTS § 61 (1942).
17 Charles Alan Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counter Claim Under Modem
Pleading, 39 IowA L. REV. 255, 270 (1954). Professor Wright was referring to an attempt
to explain the scope of the federal compulsory counterclaim rule, which applies to any
claim that "arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim." FED. R. CIr. P. 13(a).
The First Restatement gave no guidance whatsoever regarding the dimensions of an
"issue." See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68.
18 "The expression 'transaction, or series of connected transactions,' is not capable
of a mathematically precise definition; it involves a pragmatic standard to be applied
with attention to the facts of the cases." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24
cmt. b (1980). The Supreme Court discussed this change from the First Restatement in
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 130 n.12 (1983).
19 What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" ... [is] to be deter-
mined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the
facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to
the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2).
Reporter Benjamin Kaplan phrased this difference diplomatically:
I think it is evident that certain changes of style are needed in the new
Restatement. I mean that we must be more explicit, shall I say more
frank, in describing the policy considerations that underlie this branch of
law, and we must on occasion be frank and express our doubts and
dubieties.
50 A.L.I. PROC. 261 (1974) (statement of Justice Kaplan).
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reflects a modem trend that regards the law as too complex to be
reduced to a set of clear rules, and that recognizes the need for flexi-
bility and discretion if courts are to apply procedural standards eq-
uitably.20 In short, the question is no longer "What does the party
have a right to?" Rather, the question is "What is reasonable?" 21
The Second Restatement gives courts the discretion to suspend the
rules in the name ofjustice. For instance, it allows a party who can
show a "clear and convincing need for a new determination of the
issue" to win a fresh hearing on the facts, even when the black letter
rules of preclusion would block relitigation of the issue.22 A party
could base this showing on several factors, including, among others,
the "potential adverse impact of the determination on the public
interest";23 the unforeseeablity, at the time of the initial suit, that
the issue would arise in a. later suit;24 or, most generally, the lack of
"an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adju-
dication in the initial action. '" 25
The drafters of the Second Restatement were concerned that, if
courts applied established limitations in the law of preclusion too
rigidly, some litigants, who deserved to be precluded because they
20 "inhere is real reason to wonder whether it is possible to draft a formal rule [of
claim preclusion] without curtailing unduly the flexibility that is needed- in responding to
more difficult questions." WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4407 at 51.
In general, since colonial times, American civil procedure has steadily moved away
from the rigidity of the common-law writs and towards the more flexible procedures
found in equity. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). Res judicata
jurisprudence typifies the pattern that this trend has followed in recent years: an ex-
tremely rigid approach during the 19th century, see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying
text; Holland supra note 9, at 617-618, followed by a slightly less rigid codification devel-
oped in the 1930s (the First Restatement, published in 1942), which was in turn followed
by a dramatically more flexible codification developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s
(the Second Restatement, published in 1980). This pattern also appears, for instance, in
joinder rules, which evolved from the extremely narrow provisions of the 19th century
Field Code, into the more liberal provisions of the original 1939 version of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and finally into the highly discretionary approach taken by the
1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Subrin, supra, at 936,
963-64; Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 116 n.12
(1969). A similar change was made between the 1934 Restatement of the Conflict of Laws
and the 1969 Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws. See Arthur Taylor Von Mehren,
Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 963-64 (1975). See
also supra note 9 (discussing past views of procedural rights as a form of property).
Professor Kaplan, later an Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, was the reporter for both the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules, 39 F.R.D.
69, 85-111 (1966), and the first Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1973), which included most of the pro-
visions discussed in this Note.
21 Holland, supra note 9, at 619-20.





had already had a fair opportunity to present their case, would be
allowed to relitigate.26 Thus, while the Second Restatement sets forth
limitations to the rules of res judicata in order to define the situa-
tions under which preclusion should not be invoked, it consistently
refuses to state the limitations categorically, and thereby offers
courts room to create novel exceptions to the limitations.27 In al-
lowing courts to create these exceptions to the limitations, the Sec-
ond Restatement errs, because these innovations will be inherently
unforeseeable.
II
PRECLUSION NEEDS TO BE FORESEEABLE
A. The Policies Underlying Res Judicata
Commentators tend to focus on three basic goals of procedural
systems: accuracy, efficiency, and fairness. Each of these words is
used in this context in a highly specific manner. Accuracy refers to
achieving an accurate resolution of the merits of a case, rather than
accurately adjudicating whatever procedural issues arise.28 "A find-
ing of correct answers to the disputed questions of fact is ... a nec-
essary condition for doing legal justice."29
Efficiency refers to minimizing the "direct costs" of litigation
(which include "the time of lawyers, litigants, witnesses, jurors,
judges, and other people, plus paper and ink, law office and court
house maintenance, telephone service,") 30 as well as the costs that
result from delay.3 ' It does not refer to the law and economics defi-
26 See infra part III.C.1.
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 cmts. d (discussed infra part
III.B.l.a. and accompanying text) and k (discussed infra part III.B.l.b. and accompany-
ing text); § 26 cmts. a (discussed infra part III.B.2.b. and accompanying text) and b (dis-
cussed infra part III.B.2.a. and accompanying text); § 27 cmt. e (discussed infra part
III.A.1. and accompanying text); § 28 cmt. f (discussed infra part III.A.2. and accompa-
nying text).
28 Martin P. Golding, On the Adversary System and Justice, in PHILOsoPHIcAL LAw 98,
107 (Richard Bronaugh ed., 1978). See also Walter V. Schaefer, Is the Adversary System
Working in Optimal Fashion?, 70 F.R.D. 159, 160 (1976) ("The fundamental purpose of
[the adversary] system . . . is the ascertainment of the truth with respect, most fre-
quently, to an event which took place in the past.").
29 Gclding, supra note 28, at 107.
SO Richard Posner,An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure andJudicialAdministration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 401 (1973).
31 See Edmund H. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 3 (1942)
("Prompt decision on the merits is imperative, for justice delayed is often justice
denied.").
910 [Vol. 77:905
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nition ofjudicial efficiency, which has been most recently expressed
as "minimiz[ing] the sum of error [costs] and direct costs." 3 2
Fairness is not used in its broadest sense, which would include
almost all goals of a legal system, including efficiency and accuracy.
Rather, it is used narrowly, to mean that the system must conform to
the basic expectations of the parties. "To facilitate acceptance of
the outcome and resort to the process, the rules should be seen as
'fair' in terms of prevailing community values .... .,"3 These com-
peting goals frequently conflict.34
1. The Benefits of Res Judicata
a. Fairness
i. Repose
Resjudicata ensures the judicial system's fairness to litigants by
protecting the victors' legitimate expectation that judgments will be
final. The primary interest is in protecting the litigants' sense of
repose.3 5 "We want to free people from the uncertain prospect of
32 Posner, supra note 30, at 401; see also CHALs P. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 3-4
(1954) (defining judicial efficiency as "giv[ing] the algebraic maximum of satisfaction to
both parties."
33 Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 937, 938 (1975).
For instance, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is viewed by our
traditions as a matter of fundamental fairness, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964), as
is the rule against being forced to litigate in an unreasonable forum, see International
Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), and the rule requiring notice and an
opportunity to opt out of certain class actions, see Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 812 (1985).
34 For examples of the tension between accuracy and fairness, see James v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the balance between
protecting fairness by excluding illegally seized evidence and promoting the truth seek-
ing function of courts by using all available evidence); ROBERT SUMMERS ET AL., LAW: ITs
NATURE, FUNCrIoNs AND LIMITS 112 (3d ed. 1986) ("The pursuit of truth may... be
subordinated to still other social aims.... Thus, the adjudicator may be forced to apply
[evidentiary privileges] that limit or close off relevant lines of factual inquiry alto-
gether."). For an example of the tension between efficiency and fairness, see Posner,
supra note 30, at 401:
[C]onsider the question whether the defendant in an administrative ac-
tion (such as deportation...) should be entitled to a trial-type hearing.
The tendency in the legal discussion of this question has been to invoke
... a purely visceral sense of fairness .... [In an economic approach],
the increment in error cost [from the denial of the hearing] must be com-
pared with the direct costs of the hearing.
For examples of the tension between accuracy and efficiency, see id at 402 ("[Iln gen-
eral, we would not want to increase the direct costs of the legal process by one dollar in
order to reduce error costs by 50 (or 99) cents."); Morgan, supra note 31, at 3 ("Some-
times a wrong decision quickly made is better than a right decision after undue procras-
tination. 'Some concession must be made to the shortness of human life'.").
35 In this and other ways, res judicata is quite similar to the statute of limitations.
Both doctrines exist largely to protect repose. Both have a penalty aspect because they
deprive a litigant of a claim for failure to file it at the proper time. David P. Currie, Res
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litigation, with all its costs to emotional peace and the ordering of
future affairs." 3 6 Res judicata allows former litigants to talk safely
about the matters at issue in the suit without fear of later being
quoted in court, and relieves those litigants of the need to preserve
evidence or retain lawyers. As the Supreme Court has observed,
the very object for which civil courts have been established.., is
to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of
matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is es-
sential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid ofjudicial
tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of per-
son and property, if. . . conclusiveness did not attend the judg-
ments of such tribunals.3 7
Related to repose is the cost involved in repeated litigation to
protect a victory. Such costs are not only wasteful, they are unfair to
the originally victorious party. This situation is far worse if the
victor has the misfortune of facing a "wealthy, wishful or even para-
noid adversary"38 who may be willing and able to litigate endlessly,
forcing the victor to choose between an extortionate settlement and
financial ruin from endless legal fees.3 9
ii. Reliance
Society strongly encourages parties to rely on legal declarations
of their entitlements and responsibilities. In this vein, judgments
and preclusion are similar to contracts and contract law. Just as con-
tracts have social value in allowing persons to efficiently order their
affairs, 40 the value ofjudgments stems from the parties' determina-
Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 317, 337 (1978); see also infra notes 63-
67 and accompanying text (res judicata); Flores v. Edinburg Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
741 F.2d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1984) (statute of limitations). Both can also lead to harsh
consequences, because they deprive litigants of what may be just claims, and thus these
doctrines may give their opponents a windfall. See also infra notes 105-09 and accompa-
nying text (discussing how courts occasionally refuse to apply both doctrines for equita-
ble reasons).
36 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at 15.
37 Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897), quoted in Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129 (1983).
38 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at 14; see also Magnus Elec. v.
La Republica Argentina, 830 F.2d 1396, 1403 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Res judicata protects a
victorious party from being dragged into court time and time again by the same oppo-
nent on the same cause of action."); James W. Moore & Thomas S. Currier, Mutuality
and Conclusiveness ofJudgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301, 308 (1961) (stating that one of the
primary purposes of res judicata is to prevent litigants from harassing others with re-
peated suits).
39 For examples of repetitive litigation that was abusive enough to warrant the issu-
ance of an injunction against further suits, see WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1,
§ 4405, at 40 n.27.
40 L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages (pt.
1), 46 YALE LJ. 52, 61 (1936).
912 [Vol. 77:905
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tion of their rights and obligations. Just as businessmen have little
incentive to make a contract that they cannot rely upon,4 1 litigants
have little reason to go to court to seek a favorable judgment if they
fear betrayal of their trust in the judgment. Just as contract law
exists to promote reliance,42 a key purpose of preclusion is to assure
litigants that they may rely on a judgment in ordering their affairs.43
Reliance concerns are of particular importance when litigation
involves determining a legal status (as opposed to pure monetary
damages). Courts rely heavily on the results of suits that determine
personal status (e.g., paternity, divorce or denaturalization ac-
tions),44 or suits that determine ownership of property. 45 Commen-
tators and courts have noted that suits over pensions,46 water
rights,47 and the validity of contracts raise similar issues.48 In addi-
tion, reliance is at the core of suits that seek a declaratory judg-
ment.49 Finally, while reliance issues are less obvious in purely
41 Id at 61-62.
42 Id at 62.
43 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
44 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4416, at 140. Personal status
includes factors such as marriage, paternity or citizenship. Id
45 Id
46 Id
47 See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1409 (8th Cir.
1983).
48 Wright, Miller, and Cooper argue that in some situations, reliance on a prior
determination justifies "defense preclusion," under which a defendant is precluded
from raising defenses in a second suit that would undermine the plaintiff's reliance on
his first victory. This suggestion is never considered by the Second Restatement. See infra
note 131.
49 Fair Administrative Procedure for Federal Agencies is Offered in Improved Draft of a Pro-
posed Bill, 30 A.B.A. J. 6, 11 (1944).
Some cases and commentators argue that res judicata also preserves fairness by
protecting the litigants' expectation that the law will be consistent. See, e.g., WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at 12-13. However, this view is misleading,
because res judicata often has the opposite effect, freezing decisions later viewed as er-
roneous on either the facts or the law. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394 (1981) (precluding parties who failed to appeal, even though appealing co-
parties had succeeded in overturning the judgment upon which preclusion was based);
Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932) (upholding claim preclusion in two suits that ended
inconsistently and gave possession of a piece of property to one party and rents to the
other); United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924) (upholding issue preclusion on the
amount of the plaintiff's pension even though the law subsequently changed and was
applied differently to similarly situated parties); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of
Educ., 649 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1981) (precluding a claimant under Title VII who lost a
claim based on a reading of the law that was subsequently reversed). Indeed, sometimes
exceptions must be made in res judicata specifically to avoid unacceptable inconsisten-
cies. See Christian v.Jemison, 303 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962),
discussed infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
In some circumstances, issue preclusion will not apply if the law has changed, so
long as the issue in question is also a matter of law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 28(2). This exception does not apply to claim preclusion. See Harrington,
649 F.2d at 400.
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monetary suits, they can arise whenever either party makes financial
plans based on the results of prior litigation.50
b. Efficieny
Courts frequently justify preclusion as necessary to reduce
overcrowded dockets. 51 Res judicata, however, is neither designed
nor able to reduce the total amount of litigation in the court system.
For instance, even if a suit survives a motion to invoke preclusion, it
is still likely to settle before trial. Recent statistics suggest that, be-
cause of the overwhelming tendency of civil cases to settle, a court
would have to preclude more than 20 suits to avoid one trial.52 Sim-
ilarly, the declining percentage of cases that actually go to trial en-
sures that issue preclusion, which can only be invoked on the basis
of a previous trial,53 will be available in proportionally fewer cases. 54
Most importantly, the court system is already running at capacity
with delays of several years between filing and trial. 55 Thus, if a trial
is avoided in one case through the use of preclusion, another trial,
which might otherwise have been forced into settlement by exces-
sive delay, will take its place.56
The true efficiency benefit of-res judicata is the reallocation Of
legal resources away from cases that can be resolved through pre-
clusion. Preclusion lowers the direct litigation costs both for the
parties in those precluded cases and for parties to other suits which
advance on the docket as a result of the prior preclusion.57 Minimi-
zation of direct costs is critical because society gains little from most
50 See Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 828.
51 See, e.g., Federated Stores, 452 U.S. at 401.
52 See H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTrED OUTr OF COURT 179 (1980) (finding that 2123 out
of 2216 insurance cases studied in 1962 settled); George L. Priest, Private Litigants and
the Court Congestion Problem. 69 B.U. L. REv. 527, 540 (1989) (finding that the settlement
rate in county and municipal courts in Chicago ranged from 95% to 98% between 1958
and 1973). Assuming that, had they not been precluded, precluded parties wolld not
exhibit radically different settlement behavior from other litigants, these statistics indi-
cate that preclusion does little to reduce docket pressure.
53 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1.
54 Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking PlaintifAutonomy and the
Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 809, 820 n. 11 (1989).
55 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 52, at 532, 549 (finding that the average time for a suit
to progress from filing to tria in Cook County (Illinois) Circuit Court from 1959 to 1979
was 4.71 years).
56 See id at 535-36; Posner, supra note 30, at 448.
57 [Olne largely public purpose [of preclusion] has been found in preserv-
ing courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation. Although this
concern has been voiced in terms that reflect current struggles with
docket pressure, it is far from new. Since courts sit to resolve disputes,
the most attractive way of separating this concern from the need to pro-
tect individual litigants against the same burdens is to focus on the need
to ration access to a scarce public resource. The parties may be fairly
required to make the most of their first opportunity in court, rather than
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litigation. While publicized litigation and test cases can have impor-
tant collateral benefits, 58 the only benefit of the typical private, un-
publicized law suit is the resolution of the dispute before the court.
Any expenditure in the case beyond that necessary to resolve the
dispute is entirely wasted.
As the costs and delays of litigation escalate, justice becomes
less available to society's disadvantaged, who are often most in need
of its protection.59 The poor are forced to accept inadequate settle-
ments and, as litigation costs escalate over time, are forced to pay a
larger share of their recovery to their contingent-fee lawyers.60 Liti-
gation costs also burden the wallets of the general public, either
through increases in insurance rates61 (which are passed on to the
public), increased burdens on publicly funded legal services budg-
ets, or misallocation of precious judicial time, which has been esti-
mated to cost $600 per hour.62
Res judicata promotes efficiency in two ways. First, it acts as a
"procedural penalty imposed upon a party who neglects procedural
duties" 63 to bring suits in "packages"64 that minimize overall litiga-
tion costs while preserving the fairness of the system. For example,
claim preclusion and the related compulsory counterclaim rule
(which extends claim preclusion to the defendant), force parties to
consolidate related actions. Even if the issues in the related claims
differ in important respects, claim preclusion, by forcing considera-
delay the first opportunity of others or require society to support an ex-
panded court system.
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at 13. While Wright, Miller, and
Cooper express this argument, they are skeptical of it. See id. at 13-14.
58 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
59 "[Ihe effect of long court delays does not fall equally on all members of soci-
ety-although a large corporation may be able to wait many years to obtain a tort or
contract recovery, or may be content to defer liability for that length of time, someone
who is poor and seriously injured may find that justice delayed is indeed, as the saying
goes,justice denied." AM. LAw INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT 21 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1989).
60 If the amount of recovery is held constant, any increase in the cost of litigation
will result in contingent-fee attorneys demanding a higher percentage of the recovery in
future cases.
61 A recent study found that of the money spent settling asbestos claims, plaintiffs
received only 377. The rest went to pay the lawyers. Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and
Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 429-30 (1986). Because the insurer ends up pay-
ing for both sets of lawyers in a typical contingent fee situation, this data shows that the
cost of litigation has almost twice the effect on insurance rates as the cost of injuries.
62 A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L.
REV. 219, 227 (1985).
63 Ernst Schopflocher, What is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of
ResJudicata, 21 OR. L. REV. 319, 363-64 (1942).
64 Professor McCoid originated the use of the term "package" to describe the col-
lection of persons and parties before the court in a given suit. John C. McCoid, A Single
Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 708 (1976).
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tion of the additional issues in the initial suit, avoids a second round
of discovery and pretrial motions, as well as the need to educate a
second jury on the background facts of the case. Defensive, non-
mutual issue preclusion 65 broadens this rule to include situations in
which a plaintiff wishes to sue two defendants in closely related but
distinct suits. If the plaintiff brings the suits separately, he wins only
one of the suits if he wins, but he loses both suits if he loses. 66 The
plaintiff is therefore almost certain to combine them.67
Resjudicata also reduces litigation costs by precluding a litigant
from contesting an issue he has already lost in a proceeding where
he had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate." 68 Here, the purpose
is not to punish the litigant for past inefficient action,69 but rather to
reallocate resources to where they are most needed.70 The "full and
fair opportunity to litigate" ensures both that due process is satis-
fied, and that the past proceedings were sufficiently rigorous to
make the subsequent court doubt that it will have a better opportu-
65 Issue preclusion is called "'nonmutual" when a party precludes his opponent on
an issue his opponent lost in a prior trial in which the precluding party was not involved.
Such preclusion is nonmutual because, although a party can benefit from his opponent's
loss in another suit to which he was not a party, his opponent can never use her own
victory in a suit to preclude him--every opponent has a due process right to at least one
opportunity to be heard on each issue. Nonmutual preclusion is called "defensive"
when a court allows the defendant in the present suit to preclude the plaintiff from reliti-
gating issues that were decided against the plaintiff in a prior suit in which the defendant
was not involved.
66 This imbalance of risk is discussed extensively in Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the
Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 612 (1978) [hereinafter Note,
Probabilistic Analysis].
67 See Holland, supra note 9, at 627 n.33.
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1980). See also id. § 28(3), 28(5).
69 For example, in mutual issue preclusion (the parties to the second suit are the
same as the parties to the first), no one has necessarily done anything inefficient, and
neither side benefits from a failure to consolidate the suits. Rather, the stakes in the first
suit are automatically increased by allowing the first resolution of issues to preclude in
subsequent litigation. Of course, this applies only if the suits are sufficiently different
that claim preclusion does not apply. Since one of the factors of the Second Restatement's
test for claim preclusion is how far the witnesses or proofs overlap between the two
cases, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. d, issue preclusion often does
not come into play because claim preclusion blocks the second suit.
Nonmutual issue preclusion also normally does not function as a penalty. While
defensive nonmutual preclusion can deter plaintiffs from suing numerous defendants
individually, see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text, this will only have an influence
when all claims are ripe at the same time. When claims arise against different defend-
ants at different times, however, joinder is impossible, so it makes no sense to penalize a
litigant fGr not bringing one consolidated package. Offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion, which occurs when the plaintiff invokes nonmutual preclusion, is rarely justifiable
as a penalty, because the precluded defendant usually could not have forced the current
plaintiff into the prior suit. See Holland, supra note 9, at 627-28 n.33.
70 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text; WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 1, § 4403, at 15-16.
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nity to discover the truth of the matter. 71 Thus, courts can legiti-
mately dispose of previously litigated issues summarily, saving time
and money for both the litigants and the judicial system.
2. The Costs of ResJudicata
a. Fairness
Perhaps the greatest cost ofresjudicata is its harshness. One of
the most fundamental principles of the American judicial system is
the right of every litigant to an opportunity to be heard. When a
party is precluded, however, she has no right to be heard on the
merits of the case and automatically suffers an adverse determina-
tion of the claim or issue in question.
b. Efficienc
In minimizing overall litigation costs, a system of preclusion
must look beyond the cost of a trial in a given suit and consider two
kinds of unnecessary litigation expenses res judicata itself may
cause. The first is the cost of threshold litigation concerning the
very issue of preclusion. Resjudicata must be administrable without
a long and expensive inquiry into the nature of the prior suit, be-
cause having a trial to avoid a trial would be senseless. 72 Similarly, if
a formulation of res judicata invites litigants to file preclusion mo-
tions with little chance of success, the cost of unsuccessful motions
for preclusion may outweigh the trial time saved by the successful
motions.73
A second unnecessary litigation expense could arise if strict
rules of res judicata force litigants into a wasteful "use it or lose it"
mentality. The threat of expansive claim preclusion could cause
plaintiffs to raise collateral disputes that might otherwise be settled
71 While the priorjudgment is certainly not "absolute truth," see infra notes 82-84
and accompanying text, it is sufficiently reliable for a court to conclude that no further
judicial resources should be spent on the case. This is a pragmatic notion that should be
frankly seen as undermining accuracy, because any new evidence that has come to light
since the first suit is never heard.
72 See Holland, supra note 9, at 639 (discussing the expense incurred when parties
seek to invoke offensive nonmutual issue preclusion, and the court must inquire whether
the defendant had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate."). See also REsTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OFJUDGMENTS § 29; WRIGHT, MI=sAR & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4408, at 72 (warn-
ing against "rules that require detailed inquiry before a second action can be dismissed
as precluded."); id. § 4420, at 191 (noting that preclusion is worthless when ajury trial is
needed to determine what was decided in the prior case).
73 See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. See also Currie, supra note 35, at
350 (expressing concern over "the cost and uncertainty of making case-by-case inquir-
ies); WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4416, at 143 ("Uncertain and ambigu-
ous rules invite second litigation in an effort to test the limits of preclusion.").
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amicably or forgotten. 74 Similarly, if litigants fear that courts will
apply issue preclusion to any tangential issue mentioned at trial,
they might contest even trivial matters that they would otherwise
only mention in passing.75 Litigation of these collateral matters may




At first glance, preclusion seems to have little to do with accu-
racy. One of the foundational principles of res judicata is that
neither errors in the prior proceeding, nor the merits of the present
case, have any relevance to a court considering a motion to pre-
clude. As the Supreme Court stated over a century ago, "[A] judg-
ment ... is conclusive ... although it be subsequently alleged that
perfect defences actually existed. . . . If such defences were not
presented in the action, and established by competent evidence, the
subsequent allegation of their existence is of no legal conse-
quence. ' ' 77 Recently, the D.C. Circuit went so far as to sanction a
lawyer with double costs and attorney fees after he sought reversal
based on the alleged erroneous outcome of the earlier judgment of
a dismissal on res judicata grounds.78
Consequently, res judicata merely reaffirms a prior judgment,
and neither adds nor subtracts from the accuracy of that judgment.
Since society is willing to apply the force of the state to enforce the
prior judgment's determination of the rights and obligations of the
parties, it should be equally willing to use that judgment to deter-
mine the result of future suits as well. On the other hand, because
preclusion merely accepts the prior judgment as correct, it does
nothing to increase society's confidence in the priorjudgment. Pre-
clusion and accuracy seem simply unrelated.
Thus, any suggestion that resjudicata undermines the accpracy
function of courts appears far-fetched. Courts that invoke preclu-
74 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4407, at 51-52; Freer, supra note
54, at 814.
75 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4416, at 143; Currie, supra note
35, at 341; Alan N. Pollasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REV.
217, 220 (1954).
76 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4408, at 70-71; Freer, supra note
54, at 814.
77 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877). See also Federated Dep't
Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) ("IT]he res judicata consequences of a final,
tinappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may
have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another
case."). For additional cases, see WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at
17-18 n.14.
78 Holmes v. District of Columbia, 801 F.2d 1371, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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sion appear to reach the same result they would reach at trial, be-
cause they merely reaffirm the victory of a party who has already
prevailed after a full judicial inquiry into the matter.79 It therefore
seems highly unlikely that revisiting the facts would produce a dif-
ferent result. Any argument that the prior action was erroneous
must yield to the general assumption of the prior trial's legitimacy.
This view comports with the nineteenth century view ofresjudicata,
when courts viewed a prior judgment as "irrefragable truth, 80 and
spoke of the victors as having a quasi-proprietary "right" to
preclude.81
Under closer examination, however, this assumption fails.
Rather, quite the opposite is true. Jurists who develop the law of res
judicata, whether judges or members of the American Law Institute,
must assume that those precluded by the rules they announce would
win on the merits. This result is required on three levels. First,
modem procedure rejects the notion of a prior judgment as "irref-
ragable truth. '8 2 As Professor Currie so eloquently stated:
We cannot know in terms of absolute truth whether the actor
committed the wrong or not. Courts can only do their best to
determine the truth on the basis of the evidence; and the first les-
son one must learn in the subject of res judicata is that judicial
findings must not be confused with absolute truth.83
79 In nonmutual preclusion, res judicata reaffirms the defeat of the precluding
party's opponent, instead of reaffirming the precluding party's own victory.
80 Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown Steam-Packet Co. v. Sickles, 65 U.S. 333,
343 (1860); Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 364 (1859). This concept is dis-
cussed in Holland, supra note 9, at 617 n.10.
81 Holland, supra note 9, at 619-20. See also supra note 9 (discussing past views of
procedural rights in other areas).
82 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4416, at 142 ("Mhe first litigated
determination of an issue may be wrong. The risk of error runs far beyond the proposi-
tion that most matters in civil litigation are determined according to the preponderance
of the evidence. The decisional process itself is not fily rational .. "); Brainerd Cur-
rie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppek Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 315
(1957) (quoted infra text accompanying note 83); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocacy,
4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 12 (1951) ("The administration ofjustice is no more designed to elicit
the truth than the scientific approach is designed to extract justice from the atom.");
Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parlane Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action,
32 STAN. L. REV. 655, 657 (1980) (describing trials as "experiments concerning the mer-
its of issues."); McCoid, supra note 64, at 707 ("[I]t is easy to see that different triers of
law and fact, responding perhaps to slightly different evidence or presentation at differ-
ent times or places, might well reach different judgments on the same transaction.");
Morgan, supra note 31, at 3-4 (stating that "a lawsuit is not, and cannot be made, a
scientific investigation for the discovery of the truth ... ihere must be recognition at
the outset that nicely accurate results cannot be expected."); Note, Probabilistic Analysis,
supra note 66, at 626 ("A case might be litigated and relitigated indefinitely, always with
the same result, without providing any assurance that the trier of fact has determined the
'truth.' ").
83 Currie, supra note 82, at 315.
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Courts, therefore, rarely can say with confidence that the trial pre-
vented by preclusion would not have reached a different result.
Consequently, preclusion today is viewed as a matter of public pol-
icy, not of "rights" or "irrefragable truth."' 4
Second, the precluded party may well have won the prior trial,
but either lost on appeal on a legal point or failed to include a re-
lated claim or counterclaim. Thus, at least in claim preclusion,
courts often have strong reason to believe that they are precluding a
party who would succeed on the merits.8 5 This is particularly dear
when a victory in a prior trial is reversed on appeal, based on an
interpretation of the law later rejected by the Supreme Court. 6
Third, and more importantly, in developing rules of res judi-
cata, a jurist is declaring that the merits of the case are entirely irrel-
evant. Beyond the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, judges
applying rules of res judicata (whether developed by themselves or
by others) are not permitted to consider either party's actual likeli-
hood of success on the merits.8 7 Thus, when a court determines the
84 Holland, supra note 9, at 619-20.
85 The Supreme Court has invoked preclusion based on erroneous judgments On
several occasions. For example, in Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394
(1981) and in Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932), the Court applied preclusion to an
unappealed judgment that was shown to be erroneous by a subsequent appeal in a re-
lated case. For an example of a state court doing the same thing, see Belliston v.
Texaco, 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974) (Belliston II), discussed infra notes 179-92 and accom-
panying text.
86 An excellent lower court case giving judgment to the party who would probably
have lost on the merits is Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 434 (6th
Cir. 1981) (Harrington II), in which a litigant had sued for sex discrimination under Title
VII and had proved her factual allegations in the first case, only to lose on appeal on the
ground that Title VII did not authorize the type of damages sought. Harrington v.
Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978) (Harrington 1), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 932 (1979). The trial court's findings of fact in favor of the plaintiff were affirmed
on appeal. Id When, in another case decided while the appeal was pending, the
Supreme Court overturned prior precedent and allowed such damages under 42,U.S.C.
§ 1983, Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruling Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the plaintiff immediately sued again under § 1983, only to be
blocked by claim preclusion. Harrington II, 649 F.2d at 436-40. While the Sixth Circuit,
in affirming the use of claim preclusion, recognized that "in the circumstances of this
case the doctrine of res judicata seems to work an unfair result," i at 440, that nod to
accuracy did not influence their decision.
87 This rule is present for a number of reasons. First, preclusion arises on a motion
for summary judgment, when the trial court is forbidden to weigh the evidence, but
rather must believe the contentions of the nonmovant (the party to be precluded). An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Second, court's ability to grant
summary judgment on the merits of the controversy would be an independent ground
for summary judgment, not a reason to preclude. Third, if a court grants preclusion
based on a questionable view of resjudicata because it flatly does not believe one party
and wishes to avoid a trial, it is lying. It represents to the world that the merits were
irrelevant, when in fact they were controlling. Finally, when faced with a motion for
preclusion, the responding party has no reason to believe it must address the merits of
the controversy as well. Consequently, when a court entertaining a motion for preclu-
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procedural circumstances that justify preclusion, it is declaring that,
no matter how meritorious the precluded party's claims are, he will
not be given even an opportunity to be heard. 8 As the Supreme
Court has said, res judicata "blockades unexplored paths that may
lead to truth [and] shields the fraud and the cheat as well as the
honest person. It therefore is to be invoked only after careful in-
quiry."8' 9 A jurist can only legitimately declare such a rule if it as-
sumes that the rule will be applied by frauds and cheats against
parties with compelling cases, 90 and determines that the policies of
res judicata are so weighty that the trial court should still invoke
preclusion.
In sum, a court granting summary judgment on res judicata
grounds does not say "we know the truth, and it is against you."
Rather, it says "even assuming that everything you allege is true and
would be proven at a trial on the merits, the policies of res judicata
are so strong that we would prefer to give judgment to the wrong
party than allow you a chance to prove your case at trial." 91 This
sion considers the merits of a suit, it is denying the nonmovant an opportunity to be
heard.
88 There is a crucial difference between a court developing rules of preclusion and
a court applying those rules. When a trial court has discretion to preclude or not, it
participates in defining the rules of preclusion and must consider the implications of its
declaration that the substantive merits of the controversy are irrelevant under these pro-
cedural circumstances. However, when a trial court finds procedural facts under which
precedent requires precluding one party, the trial court is not participating in the shap-
ing of the rules of res judicata. Rather, it is only performing a ministerial function in
applying the precedential requirements to the facts. In those circumstances, it has no
responsibility for the decision that the substantive merits are irrelevant.
89 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979).
90 Professor Wright is quite colorful in his description of the potential precluded
party as "[a] deserving widow, a horde of hungry orphans clutching at her tattered
shawl, who is euchred out of her just claim against the scheming banker because of her
inexperienced lawyer's failure [to understand the rules of preclusion.]" Wright, supra
note 17, at 264. Professor Wright was specifically referring to the compulsory counter-
claim rule.
In a couple of reported cases the applying court could not stomach the injustice that
preclusion would create. See Christian v.Jemison, 303 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); Spilker v.
Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1951). For a discussion of both, see infra notes
105-07 and accompanying text. However, the presence of a couple extreme cases does
not change the duty ofjurists announcing rules of preclusion. Because the overwhelm-
ing majority of applying courts will not consider the merits, those framing res judicata
doctrine must only endorse rules that should apply when the precluded party has a wor-
thy case that it would prove at trial.
91 In some situations, resjudicata arguably increases accuracy by ensuring that liti-
gants get only one chance to recover. For example, in a close factual case in which the
plaintiff has a 50% chance of convincing any given jury, if a plaintiff sues several joint
tortfeasors separately, he needs only win once to recover fully. If he has the opportunity
to present his case to two different juries, his chance of winning increases from 50% to
75% even though his arguments have not changed at all. See Note, Probabilistic Analysis,
supra note 66, at 640-53. In these circumstances, nonmutual issue preclusion ensures
that he only has one chance to recover. See Holland, supra note 9, at 627 n.33. However,
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assumption puts great pressure on res judicata and requires courts
to pay careful attention to the policies that justify this harsh step.
B. The Need for Foreseeability
1. Unforeseeability Eliminates the Benefits of Preclusion
Because the benefits of res judicata depend on the expectation
of preclusion shaping litigants' behavior, res judicata only makes
sense if it is foreseeable. For example, res judicata cannot possibly
succeed in forcing litigants to bring suits in efficient "packages" if
the litigants do not know what claims those packages are supposed
to contain.
Unforeseeable doctrines of preclusion fare little better regard-
ing the fairness-based objectives of reliance and repose. Foresee-
able or not, whenever a motion for preclusion is granted, a party is
spared "the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits." 92
Beyond that, however, the peaceful repose that resjudicata seeks to
foster cannot exist so long as a litigant reasonably fears that he may
be forced to relitigate the matters he won in a past suit.93 Similarly,
as long as the law of preclusion is unclear, litigants will lack the con-
fidence necessary to rely on the results of past litigation.94
2. Unforeseeability Increases the Costs of Res Judicata
Unforeseeable preclusion also exacerbates the costs of resjudi-
cata. The accuracy cost remains constant, because the correctness
of the prior decision is not altered by the unforeseeability of the
subsequent preclusion. The costs in terms of both fairness and effi-
ciency, however, increase as preclusion becomes less foreseeable.
a. Fairness
Most importantly, unforeseeable preclusion unfairly deprives
the litigant of his constitutionally guaranteed opportunity to be
heard. Penalizing someone for failing to follow unforeseeable rules
of preclusion is fundamentally unfair, because penalties are unjusti-
fied unless the doctrine "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
even without nonmutual preclusion the cost of additional litigation and the likelihood of
impleading or intervention ensures that this scenario will not occur often.
92 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
93 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4401, at 4.
94 See id; id § 4406, at 47-48. This is perhaps one reason why courts are particu-
larly hesitant to deny preclusion when reliance is crucial (e.g., in divorce decrees and
suits to quiet title). See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; Oglala Sioux Tribe v.
Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1409 (8th Cir. 1983).
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and practices." 95 A court that invokes preclusion in an unforesee-
able manner cannot legitimately dismiss the precluded party's com-
plaints by repeating the old slogan that "[t]he predicament in which
[he] finds himself is of his own making. '"96
b. Efficiency
If the circumstances under which a court will apply preclusion
are unclear, two kinds of unnecessary and avoidable litigation will
result. First, threshold litigation over the propriety of preclusion
will increase substantially, as litigants file tenuous motions for sum-
mary judgment on preclusion grounds with little chance of suc-
cess. 97 Second, so long as the preclusive effects of a suit are unclear,
risk-averse litigants will overlitigate collateral issues and claims for
fear of being precluded -later. Any burdens on the parties or the
court that are avoided by invoking unforeseeable preclusion in one
case are therefore not eliminated-they are transferred to litigants
and courts in future cases.
Thus, when preclusion is unforeseeable, the goals of fairness
and efficiency are undermined, and the ambiguities of the law create
traps for the unwary and unprincipled windfalls for the fortunate. It
is difficult to see what policies are advanced by flexible exceptions to
limitations, beyond a result-oriented desire to avoid an expensive
trial in a given case.
3. The Tension Between Foreseeability and Flexibility
The need for foreseeability would seem to require clear and
precise rules of res judicata. However, in almost every area of the
law, there is a strong tension between clarity and flexibility. 98 This
95 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947). While this case dealt with actual
criminal penalties, the same logic applies to procedural penalties. See also United States
v. Papachristou, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (striking down for vagueness a law authorizing
punishment of, among others, "lewd, wanton and lascivious persons .... common rail-
ers and brawlers, [and] persons wandering or strolling about from place to place without
any lawful purpose or object."); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (strik-
ing down on vagueness grounds a law making it a crime for "three or more persons to
assemble ... on any of the sidewalks . . .and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by.").
96 Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198 (1932).
97 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text and infra notes 142-45 and accom-
panying text.
98 Commentators have discussed this tension in innumerable areas of the law. The
following is a list of some of the articles discussing the tradeoff between clarity and
flexibility in the last 10 years: Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83
MicH. L. REv. 1468, 1472 (1985) (Searches and Seizures); Harold H. Bruff, Public Pro-
grams, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEx. L. REv.
441, 464 (1989) (Due Process); Eric T. Freyfogle, WaterJustice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 481,
510 (Property); Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticabil-
ity: Searchingfor "The Wisdom of Solomon," 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1123, 1170 (1987) (Contract
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results from the inevitable "gray area" on the fringes of even the
most straightforward area of law. If the gray area is extremely small,
as in the Statute of Wills, the law is clear and foreseeable, but
rigid.99 If the gray area is large, as in the "reasonable person" test
of tort law, the law is flexible, but vague and unpredictable. In pre-
clusion, as in all areas of law, the competing needs for foreseeability
and flexibility must be carefully balanced.
The need for flexibility can arise in two ways. First, a compel-
ling need to ensure that the law will not be applied in unjust circum-
stances may require flexible exceptions to the law. Vague criminal
defenses, like justification, are a good example. 00 Second, practical
Law); Larry Lawrence, Misconceptions about Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Sug-
gested Methodology and Proposed Revisions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 115, 118 (1983) (Commercial
Law); David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937,
997 (1990) (Evidence); Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law,
Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doc-
trine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1379 (1986) (Civil Procedure); Suman Naresh, Incontest-
ability and Rights in Descriptive Trademarks, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 991 (1986) (Intellectual
Property); Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 33 (1980) (International Law); Thomas 0.
Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 385, 422
(Administrative Law); Teresa N. Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products
Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1131 (1988) (Torts); Lawrence A. Sullivan, The
New Merger Guidelines: An Afterword, 71 CAL. L. REV. 632, 642-43 (1983) (Antitrust Law);
Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez, and the New Rules:
Can Investors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1250 (1990) (Securities
Law); The Supreme Court 1987 Term: Leading Cases: L Constitutional Law, 102 HARV. L. REV.
143, 209 (1988) (Part 1 of 2) (Equal Protection).
It has also been mentioned in many jurisprudential articles. See, e.g., Craig M. Brad-
ley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 [hereinafter Brad-
ley, The Uncertainty Principle]; Steven J. Burton, Ronald Dworkin and Legal Positivism, 73
IOWA L. REV. 109, 126 (1987); William Ewald, Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, 97
YALE L.J. 665, 735 (1988); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 291 (1988); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal
Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Wounds?, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2099, 2119-20
(1989); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1259 (1985);
Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 100 (1988); Robert Weisberg, The Calebresian Judicial
Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 254 (1983); James G. Wil-
son, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431, 435 (1985).
Finally, the Supreme Court has commented on this tension in two areas: the Estab-
lishment Clause, Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
662 (1980), and Securities Law, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990).
99 In the well-known case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (N.Y. 1889), the New
York Court of Appeals strained to find enough flexibility in the Statute of Wills to pre-
vent a man who murdered his grandfather from inheriting under his victim's will. Nev-
ertheless, the opinion drew two dissents.
100 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (excusing
offenses that were coerced by threats of unlawful force "which a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist"); id § 2.12(3) (barring prose-
cutions when the court finds that the defendant "presents such [extenuations] that [the
defendant's conduct] cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the legislature in
forbidding the offense"); id. § 3.02(1) (excusing criminal conduct that seeks to avoid a
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considerations dictate that some laws are incapable of precise defini-
tion, so the need to implement broad substantive policy may force
policymakers to accept criminal laws that are less precise than might
otherwise be desired.101
Flexible exceptions to the rules of preclusion have quite differ-
ent effects from flexible exceptions to limitations, because the for-
mer block the harshness of preclusion, while the latter invoke it. In
creating exceptions to preclusion, the need for flexibility is para-
mount, and certain vague exceptions to res judicata in the name of
justice and fair play10 2 in some extreme cases are both tolerable and
necessary for several reasons. Primarily, since exceptions to preclu-
sion result in a fresh inquiry into- the merits of the case, they are
consistent with the accuracy function of the courts. The prior victor
will be given a fair opportunity to present his evidence at the new
trial, and if he has a strong case, he is likely to win again.' 03 In
addition, flexible exceptions to preclusion in extreme circumstances
will not significantly undermine the efficiency and fairness of the
system of res judicata as a whole. While all uncertainty makes pre-
clusion less foreseeable, a few infrequently used exceptions that
harm or evil that is "greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged").
101 Despite its great antipathy for vague criminal laws, see supra note 95, the impossi-
bility of providing clear definitions has lead the Supreme Court to tolerate some crimi-
nal laws that are quite vague and flexible. See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1
(1947) (allowing prosecutions against a person who coerces a broadcaster to employ
"any person.., in excess of the number.., needed by such licensee" because, despite
the vagueness of the language, no clearer language was possible); Nash v. United States,
229 U.S. 373 (1913) (allowing prosecutions for violating the provision in the Sherman
Antitrust Act against "undue" restraints of trade); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957) (allowing prosecution of publishers of"obscene" materials despite the notorious
difficulties in defining that term).
The limitless situations in which accidents can happen also requires the hopelessly
vague "reasonable person" test of tort law and frustrated Justice Holmes's attempt to
bring more certainty to the area of contributory negligence in traffic accidents at railroad
crossings. See Bradley, supra note 98, at 39-40.
102 The elements of fairness implicated by these concerns are not reliance and re-
pose. Rather, fairness lies in the expectation of litigants that courts will not assist pow-
erful litigants in abusing less sophisticated citizens. See infra notes 105-09 and
accompanying text.
103 Of course, just as the first suit could possibly produce the objectively wrong re-
sult, see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text, it is also possible that the first result
was correct, and that a new trial may lead to the wrong result. This is an inevitable
consequence, however, of our inability to ascertain objective truth.
In many cases, denials of preclusion might reduce accuracy, because the delay be-
tween the first and second trials could lead to the loss of physical evidence or the fading
of memories. It can also be argued, however, that the party seeking to relitigate may
present new evidence, or may present new theories of recovery that involve issues not
raised in the prior suit. Thus, one cannot say which trial is more likely to discover the
objective truth. In any case, our system uses the statute of limitations, not res judicata,
to limit the prejudice caused by delay.
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block preclusion will not enter into the calculus of litigants so long
as the exceptions are sufficiently rare and are confined to extraordi-
nary situations when preclusion is clearly unjust.1°4
Furthermore, in truly extraordinary cases, the invocation of
preclusion will be so unjust that fairness concerns weigh for, and
not against, preclusion, even when the prior victor has relied upon
the past result. Society has a particular expectation of an opportu-
nity to be heard when an unsophisticated citizen seeks relief for a
gross injustice inflicted by a more sophisticated party. Thus, a pre-
Brown 105 determination that segregated buses were constitutional
did not block a post-Brown desegregation suit, even though claim
preclusion would normally have applied,10 6 and a lawyer who ex-
torted a series of notes from an unsophisticated client and won a
suit over the first note was not permitted to preclude the issue of the
notes' validity in subsequent suits.1 0 7 To this extent, the merits of a
dispute are never truly irrelevant to a court considering a motion for
preclusion.
On the other hand, courts sometimes enforce preclusion even if
invocation seems unfair to one party, as when preclusion results
from a "calculated choice" by a sophisticated litigant.'08 In these
circumstances, the party created its own problem, and efficiency re-
quires that res judicata block relitigation, lest future similarly situ-
ated litigants also seek to exploit the newly developed loophole. 10 9
In short, as in criminal law,"10 where rules leading to acquittal
are flexible but those imposing punishment are rigid, the balance
104 This assumes, of course, that these cases are in fact rare. "If relitigation were
permitted whenever it might result in a more accurate determination, in the name of
justice,' the very values served by preclusion would be quickly destroyed." WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4426, at 265.
When flexibility is used to invoke preclusion, the rarity of the doctrine has the con-
verse effect. In the case of rare exceptions to limitations, the possiblity of an exception
will still not enter the calculus of the litigants, which ensures that the exception 'will do
little or no good. When a rare exception might block preclusion, the rarity ensures that
the exception will not significantly undermine the benefits of res judicata.
105 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 43 (1954).
106 Christian v. Jemison, 303 F.2d 52, 54-55 (5th Cir. 1962).
107 Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d. 35, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
108 Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,401 (1981). This case involved a
corporation which, along with other local companies, sued a rival for antitrust violations.
After losing in federal court, the plaintiff decided to seek a remedy in state court, while
its co-parties appealed successfully. When the plaintiff later found itself precluded, it
unsuccessfully argued that res judicata was inappropriate in light of the reversal won by
the appealing co-plaintiffs.
109 This jurisprudence is similar to cases in which the clear terms of the statute of
limitations give way to equitable concerns, a doctrine known as "equitable tolling." See
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27 (1989).
110 For discussion of the clarity-flexibility tension in criminal law, see supra notes
100-01 and accompanying text.
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between flexibility and foreseeability in preclusion depends heavily
on whether the uncertainty is used to impose or to block preclusion.
When it is used to prevent inappropriate application of res judicata
(overinclusion) through flexible exceptions in the name of fairness,
concerns of flexibility are paramount, and the effect on foreseeabil-
ity is minor, so long as the exceptions are used rarely enough that
litigants expect the application of preclusion to the results of their
disputes. Thus, the Second Restatement endorses flexible exceptions
to the rules of preclusion whenever the precluded party can show a
clear and convincing need to relitigate the matter.1 1 On the other
hand, when courts use uncertainty to prevent the clear limitations of
res judicata from functioning as loopholes for litigants who deserve
to be precluded (underinclusion), the resulting exceptions to these
limitations hinder foreseeability and do little or nothing to advance
the policies underlying preclusion.
By its nature, then, res judicata must be underinclusive to re-
main consistent with the policies it is supposed to further. 1 2 Thus,
the proper model of resjudicata law is, whenever possible, to estab-
lish clear rules, with some flexible exceptions used in rare cases, that
serve only to block, but never to invoke, preclusion in unforeseeable
situations. 113
I lI RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 26(1)(f) (1980) (claim preclusion),
28(5)(c) (issue preclusion).
112 See Currie, supra note 35, at 350 ("Mhe cost and uncertainty of making case-by-
case inquiries into competing considerations may justify categorical exceptions that are
in some respects overinclusive."). While Currie speaks of "categorical exceptions," he
clearly refers to what this Note has been calling "limitations." Of course, the use of
overinclusive limitations (because there are no exceptions to limitations) leads to an
underinclusive system of preclusion.
113 This is not to say that all flexibility in the definitions of "claim" and "issue" is
undesirable. Because these terms have proven impossible to define precisely, see supra
notes 8-17 and accompanying text, foreseeability is unattainable, making a vague doc-
trine necessary. Thus, just as the Supreme Court has occasionally approved unclear
criminal statutes when no clear definition was possible, see supra note 101, uncertain
definitions are tolerable here.
Little confusion results from these definitions, however, because the concept is intu-
itively clear. As Wright, Miller, and Cooper argue regarding the Second Restatement's defi-
nition of a claim, these are "not designed for case-by-case application. [They are] fully
consistent with clear rules that control the vast run of ordinary litigation definitions and
tolerably predictable application in unusual litigation. [Their] advantages should out-
weigh the difficulties of application that inevitably will remain." WRIoHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 1, § 4407, at 56-57. These definitions easily pass the requirement
that the rules "convey[ ] sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices." United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S.
1, 8 (1947).
Similarly, there is nothing wrong with exceptions to limitations per se, as long as
they are clear. One example of an exception to a limitation which is both useful and
clear is the two-dismissal rule. See infra text accompanying note 176.
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4. The Distinction Between Clear Rules and Vague Exceptions Is
More than Formalism
One possible objection to this analysis is that the distinction be-
tween flexible exceptions to rules of preclusion and flexible excep-
tions to limitations elevates form over substance. As long as an area
of preclusion law is unclear, it does not matter whether the doctrine
is phrased so that the uncertainty is part of the exception or part of
the rule. Thus, courts could reach the same results as occur from
exceptions to limitations on preclusion by adopting extremely broad
(but clear) definitions of preclusion with sweeping, flexible excep-
tions that allow relitigation when necessary. 114
This objection is without merit because such rules are inappro-
priate even if they are phrased in terms of clear rules and flexible
exceptions. The relevant factor is not the formulation of the rules,
but rather that the rules must be underinclusive. Were jurists to
phrase resjudicata in terms of a clear and extremely broad doctrines
of preclusion with flexible exceptions that tended to swallow the
rule, preclusion would remain unforeseeable.' 15 Litigants would
still not "package" their suits out of fear of preclusion, 16 while vic-
tors would still not have confidence in the finality of judgments.
In fact, the "broad rule-broad exception" formulation is even
worse than the "clear limitation-unforeseeable exception to the lim-
itation" model. It calls additional attention to the possibility of in-
voking unforeseeable preclusion, increasing uncertainty and making
judges more likely to use the doctrine. Finally, if preclusion is
granted in the second suit, "there will almost surely be an appeal in
every case .... It would be unfortunate, but not wholly surprising,
if whatever judicial economies are achieved ... at the trial court
114 For instance, the rule could simply state that all dismissals result in claim preclu-
sion, and that claim preclusion bars both suits against the present defendant and suits
against any other potential defendant. Similarly, issue preclusion could apply not only
to everything litigated, but also to anything that could have been litigated in the first
action. Courts could then refuse to apply these broad rules to any litigant who did not
receive a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate the given claim or issue, or whose request
to relitigate the claim or issue was "reasonable."
115 If the exception almost invariably swallows the "rule," the prospect of preclusion
will be remote. Although the phrasing of the rule will serve as a vague warning that
preclusion remains possible, in reality the mere existence of a rarely-used, sweeping
"rule" of preclusion is unlikely to affect the litigants' decisions.
116 The phrasing of the "rule" will serve as a warning that will cause the most risk-
averse litigants to assume the worst and tailor their conduct to the new "rule." How-
ever, because the "rule" will apply only in rare circumstances, litigants in many cases




level prove to be substantially offset by the proliferation of appeals
it engenders." ' 17
Thus, the formulation of resjudicata in terms of clear rules and
flexible exceptions is more than a point of legal formalism. Rather,
it reflects the need to resist attempts to make preclusion fully
inclusive.
III
UNFORESEEABLE PRECLUSION IN THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
The previous discussion rested on abstract, theoretical argu-
ments to claim that unforeseeable preclusion is an inherently flawed
concept, because it destroys the benefits of resjudicata while greatly
increasing the costs. An analysis of the cases that have invoked un-
foreseeable preclusion in ways implied by the Second Restatement sup-
ports this analysis by revealing uniformly poor results. Consistently,
decisions that have invoked preclusion by creating flexible "excep-
tions to limitations" appear result-oriented. They disregard basic
principles of res judicata, cause unnecessary litigation and appeals,
and create an unhelpful confusion in the law. The Second Restate-
ment's invitations to unforeseeable preclusion fall into three general
categories: expansions of issue preclusion; application.of claim pre-
clusion even though the first court lacked authority to adjudicate;
and application of claim preclusion despite the intent of the prior
court or the parties to the contrary.
The presence of these invitations are not a crushing indictment
of the Second Restatement. They are subtle, rarely cited, and in several
cases, have not been used by courts since the publication of the Sec-
ond Restatement in 1980. On the other hand, they represent more
than poor draftsmanship. The language of one provision is quite
explicit, l l " and the transcripts of the American Law Institute de-
bates show that certainly one other invitation, and probably all of
them, were deliberate' 19-the drafters viewed flexible exceptions to
117 Holland, supra note 9, at 641-42 (discussing the cost of the uncertainty in the
application of offensive issue preclusion). For an excellent summary of why broad nets
of preclusion are undesirable, see WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4407, at
51-52.
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (discussed infra part III.A.2.).
119 Comment n to § 20 (then numbered § 48.1) of Tentative Draft No. 1, contained
an explicit endorsement of preclusion based on a prior dismissal for lack of authority to
adjudicate. In discussing the general rule that a dismissal for lack of ripeness cannot
support claim preclusion, comment n formerly stated
The rule of this Subsection is not an inflexible one. In some instances, it
would be plainly unfair to subject the defendant to a second action on the
same claim because, for example, all issues in the case were fully litigated
in the first proceeding and the precondition the plaintiff did not satisfy
could readily have been satisfied in that proceeding, thus avoiding the
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limitations as "support[ing] the flexibility that is built into" the
burden of additional litigation. Unless the court lacks discretion under
the governing statutes or rules of court to determine that a judgment for
defendant in such circumstances shall operate as a bar, such a determina-
tion in the initial proceedings should be given great weight in any subse-
quent proceedings.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48.1 cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1973). It
was followed by Illustration 9, which gave the following example:
A sues B on B's promise of guaranty of a certain debt. After pretrial
discovery, and trial of all the issues, the action is dismissed on the ground
that A had not made a demand for payment as required by law-a de-
mand that could have been made at any time prior to dismissal. The ac-
tion is dismissed "with prejudice to any action on the same claim." The
judgment is a bar to a second action by A on B's promise of a guaranty
brought after a demand is made.
lId illus. 9.
This illustration was also used to support another invitation to unforeseeable pre-
clusion, in which the Second Restatement suggests that courts may sometimes invoke claim
preclusion based on a prior dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS, § 48.1 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1973) (currently § 20 cmt. d, discussed
infra part III.B.l.a.). This section, which ignores the general rule that dismissals for lack
ofjurisdiction cannot have claim preclusive effects, formerly contained a cross-reference
to Illustration 9.
On the floor of the American Law Institute, the Reporters declined to endorse the
result in Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (discussed
infra note 167), which provided the fact pattern used in Illustration 9 and which the
Reporters described as the "primary support" for this concept. 50 A.L.I. PRoc. 307
(1974) (statement of Reporter David Shapiro). The reporters also expressed reserva-
tions about its result in Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 48.1 reporter's note, at 59
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1973), and on the floor of the American Law Institute. 50 A.L.I.
PNoc. 307 (1974) (statement of Reporter David Shapiro). However, on the floor, the
reporters argued that
whether or not [that] case itself is correct, [the concept] is a sound one,
and it supports the flexibility that is built into [the section discussing dis-
missals for lack of ripeness]. That is, if a case is fully litigated and after
coming to a conclusion is dismissed because the plaintiff has failed to
satisfy some condition ... it is open to the trial judge to make it explicit in
his judgment that [the claim is precluded.]
This notion was rejected by the members on the floor, id at 311-15, and fsubse-
quently, comment n was amended and both illustration 9 and the cross-reference in the
comment on courts lacking jurisdiction were deleted. Comment n now reads:
The rule in this subsection is not an inflexible one. In some instances,
the doctrines of estoppel or laches could require the conclusion that it
would be plainly unfair to subject the defendant to a second action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 20 cmt. n (1980). This statement is now unob-
jectionable because the equitable doctrines mentioned operate outside of res judicata
law, which is therefore unaffected. For reasons that are not clear, the reporters
amended comment n and deleted the illustration, but did not delete the central proposi-
tion that courts without authority to adjudicate can nevertheless preclude a claim.
Interestingly, the drafters accidentally left in a reference to the deleted discussion of
Weissinger in the Reporter's Note to comment n. See id § 20 reporter's note to subsec-
tion (1)(a), at 178.
This episode shows that the drafters of the Second Restatment were fully aware of the
effect their quiet invitations would have. It therefore clearly demonstrates that the sug-
gestions in the Second Restatement that unforeseeable preclusion is sometimes proper rep-
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Second Restatment.120 Further, as shown below, courts are actually
creating such exceptions to limitations, and three courts have ex-
plicitly read either the Second Restatement or one of its Tentative
Drafts as inviting these kinds of results. 12 1 Thus, the presence of
these invitations both reflects and influences a pattern of unforesee-
able preclusion in the case law.
In each area, there have been a few courts which have reflected
the thinking of the Second Restatement by announcing novel excep-
tions to limitations. In all of these cases, the court had a good rea-
son for wishing to avoid a trial. However, none of the applications
of preclusion discussed below arejustified; they are unwarranted at
best and lawless at worst.
A. Issue Preclusion
1. Issues Not Actually Litigated
Comment e to section 27 of the Second Restatement raises the odd
possibility that issue preclusion could be invoked "even if [the issue]
was not actually litigated."' 22 By allowing the preclusion of issues
that were never actually litigated and determined, the Second Restate-
ment suggests that the litigant may lose a subsequent claim as a pen-
alty for not raising an issue in a prior suit. This, in effect, gives
claim-preclusive effects to issue preclusion.
This provision goes directly against other statements in the Sec-
ond Restatement that recognize a plaintiff may have legitimate reasons
resent a deliberate policy decision by the Reporters, and are not merely examples of
poor draftsmanship.
120 50 A.L.I. PRoc. 307 (1974) (statement of Reporter David Shapiro).
121 Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1990) (change in the burden of proof)
(discussed infra note 134 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990);
Dein Host v. Pignato, 86 B.R. 318 (D.N.H. 1988) (issues not actually litigated) (dis-
cussed infra note 130); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 528 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1975)
(dismissals for lack of ripeness-tentative draft), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 946 (1976) (dis-
cussed infra note 167).
122 Section 27 comment e states:
It is true that it is sometimes difficult to determine whether an issue was
actually litigated; even if it was not litigated, theparty's reasons for not litigat-
ing in the prior action may be such that preclusion would be appropriate. But the
policy considerations ... weigh strongly in favor of nonpreclusion, and it
is in the interest of predictability and simplicity for such a result to obtain
uniformly. [emphasis added].
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e.
Arguably, this provision is not an exception to a limitation, as are the other provi-
sions discussed in this Note, but rather is an alternative phrasing of the rule itself. Thus,
issue preclusion could be viewed in two ways. First, it could be viewed as precluding an
issue that was determined and was either litigated or unreasonably not litigated. Alter-
natively, it could be viewed as precluding an issue that was already determined-limited
to cases actually litigated--except if the decision not to litigate the issue was unreasona-
ble. However, which view is adopted is unimportant, because, in either case, this is a
vague provision that leads to unforeseeable preclusion.
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for not litigating an issue, 123 and that caution against mixing issue
preclusion and claim preclusion.' 24 In addition, the Second Restate-
ment itself cautions that precluding issues not actually litigated is
likely to be inefficient, because it may cause overlitigation. 125
Because this notion contradicts so many accepted tenets of res
judicata, it is tempting to try to avoid this odd policy by interpreting
the Second Restatement to say something more reasonable. For in-
stance, some may see this statement as merely a clumsy way of
pointing out that it may, at times, be difficult to'determine when an
issue was "actually litigated," and that, therefore, a court should
employ a pragmatic definition of "actually litigated." Such a defini-
tion might, for example, preclude issues that were raised by the
pleadings but not actually discussed at trial. A party may be sub-
stantially prejudiced by such practices if she has devoted extensive
time and money to preparing to litigate the issue in the first trial.' 26
This consideration, however, is adequately addressed in the Sec-
ond Restatement's definition of "actually litigated," which declares
that an issue is litigated when it is "properly raised, by the pleadings
or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is deter-
mined." 127 Further, the statement that preclusion might apply to an
issue "even if it was not actually litigated" 128 makes clear that this is
not part of the Second Restatement's flexible definition of "actually liti-
gated." Thus, while the doctrine is a narrow one, and while the
drafters state that "the policy considerations . . . weigh strongly in
favor of nonpreclusion,"1 29 at least one court has explicitly acknowl-
123 "The action may involve so small an amount that litigation of the issue may cost
more than the value of the lawsuit. Or the forum may be an inconvenient one in which
to produce the necessary evidence or in which to litigate at all...." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (1980).
124 Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, Title E, introductory note, states:
Courts laboring under a narrow view of the dimensions of a claim may on
occasion have expanded concepts of issue preclusion in order to avoid
relitigation of what is essentially the same dispute. Under a transaction
approach to the concept of a claim, on the other hand, there is less need
to rely on issue preclusion to put an end to the litigation of a particular
controversy.
Id. at 250.
125 "[I]f preclusive effect were given to issues not litigated, the result might serve to
discourage compromise, to decrease the likelihood that issues in an action would be
narrowed by stipulation, and thus to intensify litigation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e.
126 See WRIGrT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4419, at 180.
127 "When an issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submit-
ted for determination, and is determined, the issue is actually litigated within the mean-
ing of this Section." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. d. This is an
appropriately broad statement, and is supported by Wright, Miller, and Cooper.
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4419, at 178-81.
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e.
129 Id.
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edged that this is an invitation to preclude issues that have never
been adjudicated.18 0 At least one court has accepted the invitation
and created a trap for the unwary that was both unjust and, fortu-
nately, short lived.131
It is thus difficult to understand why the drafters of the Second
Restatement introduced flexibility into the generally accepted doc-
trine that issue preclusion applies only to matters that are actually
litigated and determined. While the problem will perhaps arise in
few situations, there is no principled reason why the problem should
exist at all.
130 See Dein Host v. Pignato, 86 B.R. 318 (D.N.H. 1988) (recognizing the possibility
of precluding issues raised in a default judgment based on this section of the Second
Restatement, but declining to do so).
131 Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924 (D. Ill. 1969). The case involved a § 1983
action seeking damages for an allegedly illegal search and seizure. The court held that
the plaintiff's failure at a prior criminal trial to challenge the admissibility of the evi-
dence seized constituted a binding admission that the search was proper. This decision
was all the more remarkable because not until 11 years later did the Supreme Court, in a
subsequent § 1983 case, approve of precluding issues determined at a suppression hear-
ing. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Furthermore, the court's action turned what
later became the Allen rule into a cruel hoax that ensured that a criminal defendant
would never be assured of having a federal forum to challenge the introduction of ille-
gally seized evidence. If the defendant seeks to have the evidence suppressed and loses,
the issue is precluded in a subsequent § 1983 case. If the defendant does not seek to
have the evidence suppressed, he is barred by the Palma rule. Fortunately, the Court of
Appeals for the circuit where this doctrine arose has described the idea as "soundly
criticized," Whitley v. Seibel, 676 F.2d 245, 249 n.8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 942
(1982), and Wright, Miller, and Cooper have suggested that it is dead. WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER, supra note 1, § 4419 n.9, at 123 (Supp. 1990).
Wright, Miller, and Cooper suggest that courts can legitimately preclude unlitigated
issues when a party to an ongoing relationship fails to litigate an issue and the other
party relies on the judgment in making long-range plans. For instance, if a tenant is
sued for unpaid rent, and he defends solely on the ground that the rent is paid, the
landlord will rely on a favorable judgment in not searching for a new tenant. If the
tenant were to successfully defend a subsequent suit for unpaid rent on the ground that
the lease was never validly signed, the inconsistent result would betray the landlord's
reliance on his prior victory. (This example is suggested by Jacobson v. Miller, I N.W.
1013 (Mich. 1879), discussed in WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4414, at
119-20.) This concern has led Wright, Miller, and Cooper to suggest that a variant of
claim preclusion, which they call "defense preclusion," should exist when "allowing the
new defense threatens direct or potential reliance interests of the plaintiff." Id. at 119.
However, it is impossible that the authors of the Second Restatement had defendant
preclusion in mind in drafting comment e, because they specifically disclaim intent to
pursue the issue. The Second Restatement states:
It should be noted that, although issue preclusion does not apply to is-
sues not actually litigated, there is a concept of estoppel in pais, not dealt
with in this Restatement, which may be applicable in appropriate cases.
Under this concept, a person who makes a representation may be es-
topped to deny its truth if the person to whom it was made has changed
his position in reliance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e. By its terms, this statement would
cover a situation described above, in which the defendant admitted the contract was
valid in the first case, and denied its validity in the second.
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2. Changes in the Standard of Proof
If the door is opened just a crack regarding issues that were not
actually litigated, it is flung wide open by the Second Restatement's
assertion that "there may be many occasions" when preclusion
should apply against a party who faces a decreased standard of
proof in the second suit. This notion disregards the established lim-
itation on issue preclusion that a party can relitigate an issue previ-
ously litigated and determined if that party's burden of proof in the
second suit is lighter than it was in the first.132
Consider a party who, with the assistance of his attorney, nego-
tiates a contract that laters proves unfavorable. If he claims that,
without his knowledge, a term in the contract was fraudulently
changed by the other party, in many jurisdictions he will have to
prove his case by clear and convincing evidence.133 If he loses that
suit, he can still sue his lawyer for malpractice for failing to inform
132 Section 28(4) states that issue preclusion should not apply if:
[Tihe party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier
burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in
the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the
adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first
action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4). However, comment f to that section
argues:
To apply issue preclusion in the cases described ... would be to hold, in
effect, that the losing party in the first action would also have lost had a
significantly different burden been imposed. While there may be many occa-
sions when such a holding would be correct, there are many others in which the
allocation and weight of the burden of persuasion ... are critical in deter-
mining who should prevail.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. f (emphasis added).
The losing party in the first action could have had a heavier burden of proof in the
prior case either a) if she is the plaintiff and, after failing to prove matters by a clear and
convincing evidence now seeks to prove the issue by a preponderance of the evidence,
or b) if she is the defendant and, after her opponent proved her case by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the opponent now must prove the issue by clear and convincing
evidence.
Section 28(4) would also prevent preclusion when the burden of establishing a
prima face case rested on one party in the first case, but rests on the other in the sec-
ond. For example, when the precluded party put forth no evidence in the first proceed-
ing based upon an erroneous belief that its opponent failed to make out a prima fade
case and subsequently lost the case, § 28(a) would allow the party to relitigate the issues
in the second case. It is at least arguable, however, that many times the issue is so
closely contested throughout the suit that the litigants and the finder of fact rapidly lose
track of which party had the burden of proof, which suggests that the placement of the
burden of proof can be ignored. Nevertheless, the Second Restatement clearly does not
suggest that this is proper, since it specifically disapproves of a case that makes that
argument. Harding v. Carr, 83 A.2d 79 (R.I. 1951), disapproved in RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28 reporter's note, at 289. In light of the repudiation of this case,
it is even more curious that the Second Restatement invites more cases along these lines.
133 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) ("One typical use of the [clear
and convincing] standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud .... ).
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him of the new terms, because in this latter suit he will only have to
prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. 134 Two circuit
courts, however, have accepted the Second Restatement's suggestion
that issue preclusion may apply despite a decrease in the precluded
party's burden of proof if the rendering court specifically states that
the precluded party failed to meet the lower burden in the original
case.135
While courts may understandably wish to avoid a trial that will
consider the same evidence presented to a prior jury, invoking pre-
clusion in these circumstances violates accepted res judicata princi-
ples on two fundamental levels.136 First, a change in the burden of
proof alters the suit sufficiently that the issue, whether a preponder-
ance of the evidence indicates that fact A is true, is different from the
issue decided previously,'whether there is clear and convincing evi-
dence that fact A is true. While a finding that there is dear and con-
vincing evidence necessarily implies that there is a preponderance,
the existence of a preponderance of the evidence by no means im-
plies that the evidence is clear and convincing. Thus, the losing
party did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question
of the lesser burden of proof, because her tactics may have been
different had she known the lesser burden of proof was also in is-
sue.'3 7 Further, under the rules of preclusion, a litigant is allowed
134 This example is based on the facts in Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990). This tactic would usually not work if both suits in-
volved the same defendant because claim preclusion would apply.
135 The cases are Marlene Indus. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1983) and Lane,
900 F.2d 1247. In Marlkne Industries, the NLRB initially sought to hold the company in
contempt for violating an earlier injunction against unfair labor practices. This suit,
which required a demonstration of a violation by clear and convincing evidence, failed.
Marlene Indus., 712 F.2d at 1014. When the NLRB sought a new injunction, which re-
quired only a preponderance of the evidence, the claim was denied on res judicata
grounds because the judge in the prior proceeding had expressly stated that the incident
in question was not an unfair labor practice and therefore, that the lower burden was not
met. Id at 1017. While the Sixth Circuit did not specifically refer to the § 28(a) com-
ment in question, it did refer to § 28(4). Id. at 1015. The court's explicit reference to
§ 28(4) and its invocation of this preclusion-burden of proof doctrine clearly indicates
that the court was influenced by the invitation.
Additionally, one would ordinarily expect the NLRB's second suit in Marlene Indus-
tries to be barred by claim preclusion. Some sort of exception must apply because of the
specialized nature of an NLRB enforcement proceeding.
136 Unlike the other doctrines considered in this Note, this doctrine arguably in-
creases accuracy, at least under these narrow circumstances, by preventing litigants from
obtaining two chances to recover through first filing the suit in which clear and convinc-
ing evidence is required, and then suing again when a preponderance of the evidence
will do. See supra note 91. Were it not for the altered burden of proof, conventional
mutual and defensive nonmutual issue preclusion would prevent the use of this tactic, as
they do in most litigation.
137 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5); Metcalfe Bros. v. American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 826, 830 (W.D. Va 1980).
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to withhold the issue of the lesser burden of proof without fear of
preclusionI 3 8-the splitting may have been a legitimate choice
based on "the irrational tactical realities that often counsel freedom
for litigants to choose whether it is better to forego the possibility of
a single comprehensive suit."13 9
Second, any determination by the prior court that the lesser
burden of proof was also not met is mere dicta. It is too unreliable
to form the basis of preclusion both because it is not essential to the
judgment140 and because it can not be appealed. 4 1
A small empirical study in this area of res judicata since the
Sixth Circuit first allowed preclusion, despite a change in the bur-
den of proof in 1983,142 provides a clear example of the problems
that can result from unforeseeable preclusion. Although the preclu-
sion-burden of proof issue is discussed in only one reported case
froman Article III court in all the years prior to that first case in
1983,143 it has appeared in 11 reported Article III decisions in the 9
years since, 9 of which were appellate, with preclusion being
granted in only 3 of them.' 44 Using a conservative 90% settlement
138 Claim preclusion is not in issue here, because under the black letter law, a plain-
tiff has a separate claim against every potential defendant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
J14DGMENTS § 50 (1980); WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4407, at 52-53.
1S9 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at 22.
140 "It is only human nature for a trier of fact or law to gloss over a matter that he
determines to relate only superficially to the final decision." Metcalfe Bros., 484 F. Supp.
at 830.
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(l).
142 Marlene Indus. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1983). See supra note 135.
143 Azalea Drive-In Theatre v. Hanft, 540 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 941 (1977). In addition, the issue was addressed in two Article I courts: North
Cent. Wool Mktg. Corp. v. Carothers (In re Carothers), 22 B.R. 114 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1982) and Manning v. lannelli (In re Iannelli), 12 B.R. 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). All
three denied the motions for collateral estoppel.
144 Court of appeals cases: Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir.) (applying pre-
clusion), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990); U.S. Aluminum v. Alumax, 831 F.2d 878 (9th
Cir. 1987) (denying preclusion), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988); Wilcox v. First Inter-
state Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987) (denying preclusion).
District court cases hearing bankruptcy appeals: McHenry v. Ward (In re Ward),
115 B.R. 532 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (denying preclusion); Nelson v. Tsamasfyros (In re
Tsamasfyros), 114 B.R. 721 (D. Colo. 1990) (applying preclusion); Hoskins v. Yanks (In
re Yanks), 100 B.R. 595 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (denying preclusion); In re Henderson, 96 B.R.
63 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1989) (denying preclusion); Laganella v. Braen (In re Braen), 94 B.R.
35 (D.N.J. 1988) (denying preclusion); Boston v. Overmyer (In re Overmyer), 52 B.R.
111 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying preclusion).
District courts as trial courts: Wilson v. Chicago, 707 F. Supp. 379 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(denying preclusion); O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, 654 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (deny-
ing preclusion).
In addition, the issue has arisen in the following Article I bankruptcy court cases:
Jerry Katzman, M.D. Opthalmic Assoc., P.A. v. Owens (In re Owens), 123 B.R. 434
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (denying preclusion); Guimond v. Guimond (In re Guimond),
122 B.R. 170 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990) (denying preclusion); Krenawsky v. Haining (In re
Haining), 119 B.R. 460 (Bankr. D. Del. 1990) (denying preclusion);Johnson v. Miera (In
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rate,145 this represents the avoidance of 0.3 trials. It is therefore
easy to see how the development of an unnecessary exception to a
limitation can cause far more litigation than it saves. In any case,
further litigation over this questionable doctrine in federal court is
unlikely, because the Supreme Court flatly rejected the doctrine in
recent dicta. 146
B. Claim Preclusion
1. Courts Lacking Authority to Adjudicate
a. Lack ofJurisdiction
The Second Restatement twice suggests that a court lacking au-
thority to adjudicate could nevertheless preclude a claim. In the
first such passage, the auihors state that a dismissal for lack ofjuris-
diction, improper venue, or nonjoinder or misjoinder of a party "or-
dinarily" could not preclude a subsequent suit after the problem had
been cured.' 47 This phrase invites the strange conclusion that in
some cases a court that has no jurisdiction over a controversy never-
theless has jurisdiction to enter what amounts to a judgment for the
re Miera), 104 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (denying preclusion);.Quality Pools v.
Lichter (In re Lichter), 104 B.R. 521 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) (denying preclusion).
Since this footnote argues that the uncertainty in res judicata law caused this
proliferation of appeals, the cases were screened to ensure these opinions would not
have been necessary without one party seeming to exploit the Second Restatement's invita-
tion to unforeseeable preclusion. Thus, the matter was also litigated in many bank-
ruptcy court decisions and appeals therefrom that are not reflected above because there
was uncertainty as to the standard of proof that applied in either the bankruptcy court or
in the prior trial court. These bankruptcy cases involved instances where there was clear
circuit precedent on the standard of proof, so the appeal was dearly based on a desire to
invoke collateral estoppel despite the change in the level of proof required.
Bankruptcy cases are numerous because, prior to the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991), many circuits had held that the stan-
dard of proof in bankruptcy discharge cases was clear and convincing evidence. The
preclusion issue arose frequently as litigants attempted to use issue preclusion from
state judgments decided on a preponderance of evidence. Grogan, however, resolved the
conflict in the circuits in favor of a preponderance of the evidence standard. l at 659.
145 See supra note 52.
146 The Supreme Court granted that a prior judgment on a preponderance of the
evidence would support issue preclusion in bankruptcy court if the bankruptcy judge
applied the preponderance of the evidence standard. The Court continued in dicta,
though, that "[i]f, however, the clear-and-convincing standard applies [in bankruptcy
court] ... [a] prior judgment [based on a preponderance of the evidence] could not be
given collateral estoppel effect." Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 658. Ironically, the Supreme
Court cited § 28(4) of the Second Restatement to support this conclusion. Id. While this
statement arose in the context of bankruptcy litigation, nothing in the statement indi-
cated an intention to limit it to that context.
147 Section 20 comment d states that "a dismissal [for lack ofjurisdiction, improper
venue, or nonjoinder or misjoinder of a party] is so plainly based on a threshold deter-
mination that a specification that the dismissal will be a bar should ordinarily be of no
effect." (emphasis added).
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defendants.1 48 Similarly, a case dismissed for nonjoinder, misjoin-
der, or improper venue is never properly before the court, leaving it
without authority to adjudicate. The Second Restatement, however,
would deem that the court somehow obtains such authority.
The problems with this "exception to a limitation" are reflected
in Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa, 149 a California state court decision
that applied claim preclusion to state claims over which the federal
court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction. On the surface, the
decision seems wise. The plaintiff had sued originally in federal
court on a tenuous section 1983 action and sought to include
equally tenuous pendent state claims.' 50 When the federal court de-
clined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claims, the
plaintiff decided to continue his section 1983 case in federal court
and subsequently pursue the related state-law claims in state
court.15 1 After a jury returned a general verdict against the plaintiff
and the federal court fined him under Rule 11 for bringing a frivo-
lous claim,' 52 it was understandable that the California court did not
want to revisit this highly questionable claim.
Unfortunately, standard res judicata doctrines were not avail-
able. The proper means for precluding relitigation of similar facts is
issue preclusion, which the state court found inapplicable here be-
cause the federal claims were sufficiently different from the state law
claim.' 53 Further, the court went on to find, based in large part on
the tentative draft to the Second Restatement, that a plaintiff may legiti-
148 This statement is all the more curious in view of the statement found later in the
§ 20 comment that "the judgment should not operate as a bar if one of [two alternative]
determinations is that the court in which the action was brought lacked subject matter or
personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 20 cmt. e.
Of course, there is a well-established doctrine that a court without jurisdiction could
render a decision on the merits, with preclusive effect, if it erroneously concluded that it
has jurisdiction. This rests on the principle that a court's determination of its ownjuris-
diction is itself res judicata. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963). However, the
Second Restatement is not discussing that situation, since it refers to cases dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
Similarly, a court that has not yet determined whether or not it has jurisdiction
could possibly dismiss with prejudice because of the plaintiff's failure to obey an order
of the court. However, this is an extremely clear and well-established doctrine. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 41(b). While it may be construed as an exception to a limitation, the doctrine
is completely foreseeable.
149 164 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
15o Id. at 915.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Specifically, the California court found that the § 1983 action, which sought to
prove an assault by state officers, required the plaintiff to prove that the injuries were
intentionally inflicted. Id. at 916. Since there was no such mens rea element in the state




mately split his claim when he sues in federal court and the federal
court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction. 5 At this point, in-
quiry into preclusion should have ceased. Instead, the court then
announced the surprising doctrine that, while the plaintiff acted
properly in going to federal court in the first instance, he waived his
right to pursue the state law claims when he proceeded to trial after
the court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction.15 5
The court's result is highly questionable in several respects.
First, the California court's insistence that the plaintiff seek a volun-
tary dismissal as to his state claims was highly impractical. The fed-
eral court did not rule on the question of pendent jurisdiction until
nine months after the suit was filed, well after the time when he
could have elected a dismissal without prejudice as a matter of
right.1 56 Second, the rule is so novel and counterintuitive that it
functions entirely as a trap for the unwary. 157 Third, the doctrine
ignores the federal policy of providing a federal forum to hear fed-
eral questions-a key purpose in the original enactment of section
1983.158 By stripping the plaintiff of his state claim as a price for
exercising his right to a federal forum for his section 1983 claims,
the court violates the Supremacy Clause, which "secures federal
rights by according them priority when they come into 'conflict with
state law."' 159 Finally, if there is a villain in this suit who may fairly
be charged with wasting judicial resources, it is the federal judge,
154 While comment e to [§ 25] ... does not expressly deal with the situation
where the plaintiff has attempted to have the federal court exercise pen-
dent jurisdiction and the federal court has refused to do so, it is fairly
plain from the comment... that the authors of the Restatement Second
would conclude that a subsequent state court action is not barred.
Id. at 921. This position is supported by WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1,
§ 4412, at 96.
155 Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa, 164 Cal. Rptr. 913, 921-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
156 Under Rule 41 (a), a plaintiff may dismiss as a matter of right "at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment." FED.
R. Crv. P. 41(a). Because the answer must be served within 20 days, FED. R. Crv. P.
12(a), the time for voluntary dismissal had long since passed.
157 After all, the notion that a court that lacks jurisdiction could nevertheless assume
the power to preclude a claim is almost a contradiction in terms. Wright, Miller, and
Cooper argue that "[n]o apparent reason exists to justify forfeiture of the underlying
claims upon a mistaken choice of tribunal .... [A] court that orders dismissal on these
grounds should not have any discretion to direct that the dismissal will preclude a sec-
ond action on the same claim." WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4436, at 347
(emphasis added).
158 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 108-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159 Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865, 872 (1991).
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who could have disposed of the state law claims with minimal effort
by exercising pendent jurisdictionl 60 or by using a special verdict.' 6'
b. Unripe Claims
In the same section, the Second Restatement raises the similarly
startling possibility that a court could invoke claim preclusion based
on a prior dismissal for lack of ripeness. 62 This notion that courts
160 The federal court clearly had discretion to exert pendent jurisdiction. Under
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the federal court has jurisdiction so long as the
complaint "is drawn so as to claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of
the United States." Id. at 681. The federal complaint clearly met that standard by alleg-
ing an intentional assault. While Bell also states that "a suit may sometimes be dismissed
for want ofjurisdiction where the alleged [federal claim] ... is wholly insubstantial and
frivolous," id. at 682-83 (emphasis added), as was the case here, this statement is
phrased in discretionary terms. Indeed, the importance of exerting pendent jurisdiction
in these situations was emphasized in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966), in which the Supreme Court urged district judges to look to "considerations of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness," id. at 726, in deciding whether to exercise
pendent jurisdiction. Subsequent events proved that these factors weighed strongly in
favor of pendent jurisdiction in this case.
161 Had the judge used a special verdict, it might have revealed that the jury found
that the alleged assault never occurred, and therefore did not reach the question of the
state officials' intent. This information would have allowed the use of issue preclusion
and would have barred the second suit.
162 Section 20 comments k and 1 of the Second Restatement state:
k. A determination by the court that the plaintiff has no enforceable
claim because the action is premature, or because he has failed to satisfy a
precondition to suit, is not a determination that he may not have an en-
forceable claim thereafter, and does not normally preclude him from main-
taining an action when the claim has become enforceable.... [emphasis
added]
The rule stated [above] is applicable whether the fact that the action is
premature, or that a precondition has not been satisfied, appears on the
face of the pleadings, as a result of pretrial discovery, or from the evi-
dence at trial.
I. The rule stated [above] is applicable to a case in which the time for
performance had not arrived when the plaintiff brought the action.
This concept is later specifically repeated in the context of contracts. Section 26
comment g of the Second Restatement states:
Ajudgment in an action for breach of contract does not normally preclude
the plaintiff from thereafter maintaining an action for breaches of the
same contract that consist of failure to render performance due after
commencement of the first action. [emphasis added]
One can argue that the Second Restatement's suggestion that claim preclusion might
sometimes apply to unripe claims merely represents the narrow and familiar rule that all
claims mature immediately when a contract has been repudiated, even if the time for
performance is still in the future. For example, comment g goes on to state:
But if the initial breach is accompanied or followed by a "repudiation,"
•.. and the plaintiff thereafter commences an action for damages, he is
obliged in order to avoid "splitting," to claim all his damages with re-
spect to the contract, prospective as well as past, and the judgment in the
action precludes any further action by the plaintiff for damages arising
from the contract.
However, that narrow interpretation is a tortured one. First, the presence of the
"normally" language in § 20 comment k as well as § 26 comment g explicitly suggests
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can preclude unripe claims has precedent in two areas of law,
neither of which is sound. The first involves claims against the gov-
ernment, in which plaintiffs lose claims that arise after the initiation
of the suit because of their failure to amend the pleadings to include
these late-maturing claims. This doctrine has been applied both by
a district court 63 and by the Court of Claims. 164 While this doctrine
that an exception allowing preclusion for lack of ripeness extends beyond contract, par-
ticularly in light of the express statement in comment I that comment k applies to mat-
ters involving future obligation. Second, comment k says that preclusion does not
"normally" apply if the claim is "premature." This formulation cannot anticipate an
exception for contract cases involving a repudiation, which justify preclusion precisely
because the entire claim has matured. Third, if the reporters of the Second Restatement
had intended to limit the doctrine to repudiation, they could have stated flatly that pre-
clusion does not apply unless a repudiation has occurred. Thus, it seems clear that the
authors of the Second Restatement intended to repeat their general views on ripeness in the
specific context of contracts.
163 Nernberg v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 752 (W.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd without
published opinion, 612 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979). This case involved a claim under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988), for medical malpractice.
The plaintiff had previously sued under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.. § 1346(a)(2) (1988),
but lost on summaryjudgment. Nernberg, 463 F. Supp. at 753. At the time, however, he
had not exhausted his administrative remedies under the FTCA, and thus could not join
the two suits. Idr at 753-54.
Nevertheless, the district judge applied claim preclusion to the FTCA suit. The
court reasoned that, had the plaintiff alerted the court to the possibility of joining an
alternative theory of relief, the court would have delayed disposition of the case until the
FTCA claims could be joined. Id at 754. However, the opinion is openly ad hoc, argu-
ing frankly "[w]e do not believe that the failure of the Plaintiffs to exhaust their adminis-
trative remedies by the time the first lawsuit was filed should allow them to burden the
judicial system with a second lawsuit based upon precisely the same conduct of the De-
fendant." Idr
The hole in the court's theory is that no rule requires the plaintiffs to do what the
court suggests. It is thus patently unfair for the court to preclude them from arguing a
claim that may have merit. Further, if it is true, as the court states, that the change in
statutory authority is the "only... difference between the prior lawsuit and the instant
one," id at 753, the doctrine of issue preclusion will usually dispose of the matter. It is
not clear why the court did not rely on issue preclusion in this opinion, but one suspects
that the grounds for summary judgment in the Tucker Act action were not fatal to the
FTCA claim (the prior decision is unreported).
The court's reliance on conservation ofjudicial resources is also questionable. The
first suit was disposed of on summary judgment, so the suit could not have consumed an
excess ofjudicial resources. The second suit was also brought a few months after dis-
missal of the original suit, so the time the government spent preparing for the first case
would presumably be applicable to the second. Finally, the judge also found in the alter-
native, in two sentences at the end of the opinion, that the FTCA did not apply to the
case at bar. Id at 754. This alternative holding renders this questionable expansion of
claim preclusion wholly unnecessary and undermines the court's claim that failure to
preclude the second suit would "burden the judicial system." lI
164 In Electric Boat Co. v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 361, 367-68 (Ct. Cl. 1935), cert.
denied, 297 U.S. 710 (1936), the Court of Claims held that a litigant who brings suit
against the government must continually amend his suit to add any claims that arise
under the contract during the pendency of the suit. This holding runs directly contrary
to black letter law, see, e.g., WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4409, at 76-77;
RESTATEMENT OFJUDGMENTS § 62 cmt. b (1942), and is not discussed or supported by
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may be desirable on efficiency grounds, 165 that does not excuse se-
lectively applying it in extremely rare instances, 166 when it necessar-
ily functions as an unforeseeable trap. In any event, issue
preclusion will prevent excessive relitigation in such cases.
Courts have also applied claim preclusion to cases dismissed as
unripe when the lack of ripeness is discovered only after a full trial
on the merits.167 It is easy to sympathize with the judges in these
any aspect of the Federal Rules. It thus functions almost entirely as a trap for the
unwary.
165 If a litigant knows that future claims will arise, it makes sense to require him to
move for declaratoryjudgment. While issue preclusion will often streamline subsequent
litigation, minor variations in the law or the circumstances may render issue preclusion
inapplicable, or may require a separate calculation of damages. However, most litigants
will combine their claims of their own accord, because doing so will reduce their attor-
ney's fees.
166 Neither of these cases have been followed. Only one court has cited the Nernberg
exposition on claim preclusion, and that court declined to follow the precedent. Ludwig
v. Quebecor Dailies, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 594, 596 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Electric Boat, de-
cided over 55 years ago, is also a legal orphan. The only case subsequently citing it,
Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 512 F.2d 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1975), recognized this
doctrine in dicta as binding precedent but declined to expand it. Id. at 1087.
167 In Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1968), the government
had sued the defendant to collect a debt that was payable "immediately... upon written
demand." Three months before trial, the defendant amended her answer to include the
government's failure to demand payment as a defense. After a full trial on the merits,
the district court explicitly rejected ten defenses proffered by the defense, but ruled for
the defense on the ripeness issue and dismissed the suit "with prejudice." When the
government demanded payment and sought to sue again, the Fifth Circuit ruled en banc
that claim preclusion should apply. Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.
1970) (en banc). This case was disposed of in an opinion focusing on Rule 4 1(b) and on
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961), which held that despite the wording of
Rule 4 1(b), a dismissal for lack of ripeness was without prejudice. Nevertheless, Wright,
Miller, and Cooper properly state that the opinion "leave[s] the question hanging," and
focus instead on the extent of the negligence of the plaintiff in failing to meet the ripe-
ness requirement. WRIGr, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4435, at 338. Weissinger
was the inspiration for this provision in the Second Restatement. See supra note 119.
In Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 528 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 946 (1976), the plaintiff had filed a string of suits and EEOC complaints against the
defendant. Id at 936. The Fourth Circuit had affirmed the dismissal of the most recent
suit solely on the ground that the suit was unripe because the plaintiff lacked a valid
EEOC "right to sue" letter. The plaintiff promptly filed a new suit which the trial court
dismissed, finding that the dismissal of the prior suit on ripeness grounds precluded the
latter claim. Id at 937. Citing both Weissinger and the Tentative Draft of the Second
Restatement, see supra note 119, the Fourth Circuit agreed. The court focused both on the
burden that the second suit placed on the defendant, and that this burden was caused by
plaintiff's "intentional disregard of the statutory precondition." Id. at 938. Given the
plaintiffs persistence in filing related unsuccessful claims, the Fourth Circuit's eagerness
to be rid of the case is not surprising.
Both of these cases are discussed extensively inJohn E. Eichhorst, Note, ResJudicata
Effects of Involuntary Dismissals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 667 (1985). Weissinger has been the
focus of several notes: Neil J. Orleans, Note, 49 TEX. L. REv. 372 (1971); Ira J.
Smotherman, Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Rule 41(B)-ResJudicata Effect of
Involuntary Dismissal With Prejudice, 19J. Pun. L. 423 (1970); Note, Rule 41(b), Federal Rules
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cases. 6 8 After a full trial on the merits, the courts find that they
cannot give judgment because of a ripeness problem. Worse, be-
cause any conclusions on the issues in the suit will not be essential
to the judgment, issue preclusion also will not prevent relitigation of
the entire case. It is thus understandable that judges in these cases
do not look favorably on the plaintiffs whose negligence caused
these problems. Accordingly, one commentator has defended the
use of claim preclusion in these situations, arguing that courts
should apply preclusion when three conditions are met: "First, the
defendant must have undergone substantial preparation to meet the
merits. Second, the plaintiff must have been able to avoid the need
for such preparation by exercising -reasonable measures. Third, the
defendant must not have intentionally waived the maturity or pre-
condition required."' 169 A similar standard was proposed in an early
draft of the Second Restatement,170 but was eliminated at the 1973
American Law Institute meeting. 17 '
The problem with these proposals, and with the cases that in-
spired them, is that they seek to use resjudicata to serve a purpose it
is ill-adapted to serve-to exact retribution and restitution from a
litigant whose negligence wasted the resources of both the court
and the parties.' 72 When courts use res judicata to compensate a
litigant's opponent for expending unnecessary legal expenses, the
amount of the compensation (the value of the claim) is unrelated to
the scope of the injury (the unnecessary legal expenses). Indeed,
resjudicata may strip a litigant of a claim worth tens or hundreds of
times more than the unnecessary expenses caused by his negli-
gence.173 Rule 11, not res judicata, properly serves this purpose by
of Civil Procedure-Is a Spedfying Dismissal Order Unimpeachable? Weissinger v. United States,
31 MD. L. REv. 85 (1971).
168 It is more difficult to sympathize with the defendants, because they were equally
able to point out the obvious ripeness problem at an early stage in the proceeding, and
thereby avoid the expense of a wasted trial. See 50 A.L.I. Paoc. 311-12 (1974) (state-
ment of Judge Leventhal) (arguing in a similar hypothetical that the defendant was
equally at fault).
169 Eichhorst, Note, supra note 167, at 690. On the basis of this suggestion, the
author approved of Stebbins. Id. at 693.
170 This standard would have allowed claim preclusion when "the circumstances are
such that it would be manifestly unfair to subject the defendant to [a second] action."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 48.1(2) cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1973).
171 An extensive discussion of the circumstances surrounding the deletion of this
provision appears in Eichhorst, Note, supra note 167, at 688-90, and supra note 119.
172 The efficiency aspect of res judicata is designed to prevent future unnecessary
legal fees, not to exact retribution or restitution for past negligent practices. Even the
punitive aspects of claim preclusion, see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text, exist
as a deterrent, not as retribution or restitution.
173 Edward W. Cleary, ResJudicata Reexamined, 57 YALE LJ. 339, 350 (1948). It is
strange to give the defendant a windfall just because the plaintiff has made a correctable
procedural error. See supra note 168. Indeed, in both cases discussed above, the trial
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allowing a court to impose sanctions, including the opponents legal
fees, on a party who files papers that are not reasonably based on
the facts and the law. 174 Hence, if a plaintiff unreasonably wastes
the time of the court and his opponent, Rule 11 vindicates their in-
terests without muddling res judicata law or causing the plaintiff to
forfeit a claim that may be worth many times the legal fees incurred
in the initial action.
2. Judgments Intended Not to Preclude
Finally, the Second Restatement suggests two instances in which
preclusion may be proper despite the clear intent of the rendering
court or the parties to prevent preclusion: dismissals that are ex-
plicitly without prejudice, and agreements to split claims. Viewed in
isolation, each instance could represent merely a poorly drafted at-
tempt to articulate a clear and narrow exception to a limitation.
Taken as a whole, however, they amount to far more than that.
First, there is nothing narrow about the language, as they are both
phrased in extremely broad terms. While a narrowing construction
is possible, it would involve a tortured and unlikely reading of
the Second Restatement. Most importantly, a broad reading of these
phrases is consistent with the overall theme of the Second Restatement
towards allowing courts the -discretion to invoke preclusion
unforeseeably.
a. Dismissals That Are "Without Prejudice"
The first such doctrine implies that a court could invoke preclu-
sion in a second suit even though the prior suit was dismissed "with-
out prejudice."' 75 This statement may apply when a rule of the
courts had found that the plaintiffs should prevail on the merits, and thus the preclusion
did, in fact, give defendants a windfall.
174 Rule 11 states, in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attor-
ney's individual name .... The signature of an attorney or party consti-
tutes a certificate by the signer . . . that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
In fairness to the drafters of Tentative Draft No. I of the Second Restatement, the pres-
ent text of Rule 11 was not enacted until 1983, ten years after their work. The text in
effect in 1973 was very weak, and it is recognized to have "not been effective in deterring
abuses." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983). See infra notes 212-13
and accompanying text.
175 Section 26 comment b states that "[a] determination by the court that its judg-
ment is 'without prejudice' ... to a second action on the omitted part of the claim ....
944 [Vol. 77:905
1992] UNFORESEEABLE PRECLUSION 945
court may automatically cause a voluntary dismissal to preclude fur-
ther litigation on the claim, regardless of how the dismissal was
labelled. This occurs most notably under the "two-dismissal rule,"
which states that once a plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed the same
claim twice, his claim is precluded. 176 However, since this narrow
exception is dealt with elsewhere in the Second Restatement,177 it
seems clear that the drafters intended to give courts broader
discretion. 178
An example of a court that improperly recast a dismissal with-
out prejudice as one with prejudice is found in Belliston v. Texaco. 179
The plaintiff had won the original suit in federal district court where
he claimed damages for breach of-federal antitrust and commercial
laws but did not assert identical claims under state law. On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding in a technical opinion that the
unless reversed or set aside, should ordinarily be given effect in the second action." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. b (emphasis added).
176 See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
177 The reporter's note states:
the second action should be held maintainable even though the court in
the first action was wrong in making the express reservation [that the dis-
missal was without prejudice]. However, the effectiveness of a reserva-
tion may conceivably be impaired by statutes or rules regarding dismissals
of actions, which should be consulted. Compare Comment h to § 20.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. b, reporter's note (emphasis added).
Section 20 comment h, in turn, indicates:
[T]he specification that a dismissal is without prejudice must not be in-
consistent with a governing statute or rule in thejurisdiction. For exam-
ple, . . in many jurisdictions, a voluntary dismissal operates as a bar to
another action on the same claim when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in any court of the United States or any state an action based
on or including that claim. In such circumstances, a notation in the rec-
ord that a nonsuit or dismissal is "without prejudice" . . is not effective
because the judgment operates as a bar as a matter of law.
This is the only explanation that the Second Restatement offers for precluding litigants in
spite of clear principles of res judicata.
This explanation is eminently reasonable, particularly because courts often enter
voluntary dismissals before the defendant is even aware of the suit. In such cases the
defendant has no opportunity to argue that the dismissal should have been with preju-
dice. Indeed, if plaintiffs could successfully trick judges in this manner, judge-shopping
would proliferate, with plaintiffs going from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, filing voluntary
dismissals without notifying defendants until they received a favorable judge.
178 The notion that the vague invitation to preclude based on dismissals without
prejudice refers only to the two-dismissal rule is difficult to defend. In light of repeated
invitations to courts to ignore the rules of res judicata and develop novel exceptions to
limitations, this provision can be sensibly read as another such invitation and could pro-
vide authority for ajudge who seeks tojustify second-guessing a dismissal without preju-
dice. It also encourages wasteful attempts to exploit this uncertainty in the rules. It
would have been far better to state originally that, "A determination by the court that its
judgment is without prejudice to a second action on the claim should be given effect in
the second action unless it is contrary to an express rule of the jurisdiction."
179 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972) (Belliston I); 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974) (Belliston
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actions in question did not constitute interstate commerce and that
the dispute therefore was a local matter beyond the reach of the
federal statute. 1s0
At this point, the plaintiff should have lost both his federal and
his state claims. Under Bell v. Hood,18' if a federal claim that is not
"wholly insubstantial and frivolous"'1 2 is brought but is later found
to be outside the ambit of federal law, the court can still exercise
pendent jurisdiction over a related state claim. Since Bell explicitly
states that "failure to state a proper cause of action calls for ajudg-
ment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdic-
tion,"' s3 and since it is well-established that a federal suit will
preclude pendent state claims if the plaintiff never seeks to join pen-
dent claims,18 4 claim preclusion would ordinarily have barred both
claims.
However, for reasons that do not appear on the record, the
Tenth Circuit decided not to preclude the plaintiffs claim. Choosing
instead to ignore Bell (which is never mentioned in the opinion) and
dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, 8 5 the court allowed the
plaintiff to refile the state claim in Utah state court. This determina-
tion is so plainly at odds with the explicit terms of Bell that it seems
clear that, in actuality, the court was really exercising its discretion
under Rule 41 (b)18 6 to specify that the dismissal for failure to state a
claim was without prejudice.' 8 7
When the state court suit was brought,188 the Supreme Court of
Utah apparently did not appreciate being the tool of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's largesse. It therefore re-examined the facts of the case, and
180 Belliston 1, 455 F.2d at 177-81.
181 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
182 Id. at 682-83.
183 Id. at 682.
184 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. e, reporter's note; WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4412, at 96. The situation is quite different if pendent
jurisdiction is sought and is denied by the trial court. See supra note 154 and accompany-
ing text.
185 Belliston 1, 455 F.2d at 181.
186 FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
187 This is a classic example of a court's use of flexibility to avoid preclusion due to
special circumstances. Had the Tenth Circuit's action been allowed to stand, injustice to
the plaintiff would have been avoided, while the precedent would have been sufficiently
unusual that no sane litigant would ignore the rules of efficiency and count on a similar
ruling. Wright, Miller and Cooper recognize the importance of this flexibility, stating
that "[i]t is possible that a court may allow dismissal without prejudice.., even after a
plaintiff has failed at a trial on the merits, in light of a persuasive showing that the failure
was excusable and that the plaintiff deserves a second opportunity." WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 1, § 4435, at 331.
188 Belliston 11, 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974).
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concluded that the dismissal was properly with prejudice because of
the plaintiff's failure to raise the state claim in the federal suit.1 89
The state court opinion lost sight of two fundamental princi-
ples. First and foremost, the opinion ignored the principle that a
court must have the power to dismiss suits without prejudice. 190 In
this case, the Supreme Court of Utah thwarted the dear will of the
Tenth Circuit, and thereby infringed on the latter's jurisdiction to
dispose of its cases as it sees fit. By ignoring the clear specification
that the prior dismissal was not on the merits, the Utah court also
ignored the fact that the specification of the dismissal as "without
prejudice" was itself res judicata.1 9 1 While the action of the Utah
Supreme Court cannot fairly be called a trap for the unwary (since
the plaintiffs did not venture in of their own free will but rather were
placed there by circumstance), it is certainly unprincipled.
More importantly, the state court's decision sacrificing foresee-
ability to promote flexibility in this case was pointless. 192 The Tenth
Circuit's action was sufficiently remarkable that no class of future
litigants would be able to take advantage of similar rulings; thus, the
decision of the state court promoted neither efficiency nor clarity in
the law. The federal trial and appeal make clear that Texaco never
had legitimate grounds for reliance or repose, and also that judg-
189 The state court's action rested on the theory that the plaintiff could have avoided
the entire problem had he approached his federal suit more cautiously. First, pendent
jurisdiction was clearly appropriate and would have prevented the entire problem. Id at
381-82. Second, plaintiff could have withstood the dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction sim-
ply by pleading diversity jurisdiction but failed to do so. Id. at 380 & nA. Thus, the
state court concluded that since the plaintiff failed to take advantage of an opportunity
to include his claims under either diversity or pendent jurisdiction, claim preclusion
properly barred his claim. Id. at 382.
Were it not for the sympathy of the Tenth Circuit, the state court would have been
right-the plaintiff's inefficient behavior would have justly been penalized by claim pre-
clusion. Once the Tenth Circuit made its lenient ruling, however, the situation was en-
tirely different.
190 Despite the general rule that a court cannot dictate preclusion conse-
quences at the time of deciding a first action, it should have power to
narrow the ordinary rules of preclusion. A judgment that expressly
leaves open the opportunity to bring a second action on specified parts of
the claim.., should be effective to forestall preclusion.
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4412, at 106.
191 Under principles of the conflicts of laws and full faith and credit, the Utah court
could have applied preclusion only if the Tenth Circuit would have done so. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENrS § 87 (1980); Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized ResJudi-
cata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 773 (1976). See also Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947) (A
court in another jurisdiction has "as much leeway to disregard the judgment ... as does
the State where it was rendered."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 94-
95 (1969) (stating that when a litigant seeks to use the judgment of one state to preclude
in another, the res judicata law of the rendering state controls).
192 Indeed, the state court's dismissal works against flexibility, because it effectively
reversed the decision of the Tenth Circuit to use its discretion to give the plaintiff a
second chance because of the unusual circumstances of the case.
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ment probably went to the party who would have lost on the merits.
The only thing that the Supreme Court of Utah accomplished was
the removal of one case from the docket of its court system. Given
the prior litigation on identical issues, this case was a prime candi-
date for settlement anyway.
b. Agreements to Split Claims
The final example of the Second Restatement's suggestions that
courts develop unforeseeable exceptions to clear limitations is the
implication that claim preclusion could apply despite an express
agreement between the parties to split the claim.1 93 Refusing to
enforce such an agreement makes perfect sense if it is based on stan-
dard equitable doctrines, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionabil-
ity.' 94 However, the Second Restatement's broadly phrased license to
disregard these agreements was not likely intended to carry such a
narrow meaning. If the drafters intended merely to leave room for
such general equitable principles, they would have stated them
clearly and explicitly, as they do in other areas where courts are
given discretion to invoke equitable doctrines.1 95 Rather, the Second
Restatement's pattern of flexible exceptions to limitations clearly indi-
cates that the inclusion of this provision is another invitation to un-
foreseeable preclusion-in this case, a doctrine that would allow
courts to void claim-splitting agreements as contrary to the policies
of res judicata.
On the surface, the suggestion that res judicata could be im-
posed unilaterally by the court seems odd, because res judicata has
always been an affirmative defense which, if not raised by party, is
waived.196 Res judicata, however, does contain important efficiency
195 Section 26 comment h of the Second Restatement states:
The parties to a pending action may agree that some part of the claim
shall be withdrawn from the action with the understanding that the plain-
tiff shall not be precluded from subsequently maintaining an action based
upon it. The agreement will normally be given effect. (emphasis added).
194 These doctrines would apply regardless of whether a settlement is viewed as a
contract, WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, § 4443, at 383, or as a judgment, IB JAMES W.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0A0915]. If the settlement is a contract,
the Restatement of Contracts would automatically apply and the agreement would be void.
If it is a judgment (in which case the splitting of the claim would come down via issue
preclusion), rules voiding fraudulently procured judgments or consent decrees that are
contrary to public policy would block preclusion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 28 cmt.j (blocking preclusion that results from concealment or mental or physi-
cal disability); MOORE ET AL., supra, 0.409[5], at 330.
195 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 20 cmt. n (allowing for the doctrines
of estoppel or laches); id. § 26 cmt.j (allowing for waiver of claim preclusion that results
from "mistake or fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation by the defendant").




benefits for the judicial system as well as for the litigants. 197 These
benefits to the courts may explain judges' eagerness to impose res
judicata of their own accord.1 98
Nevertheless, the invalidation of claim-splitting agreements
represents a "short-sighted insistence on 'efficient' litigation."' 99
First, even if claim preclusion is inapplicable, issue preclusion can
still ensure "efficient" litigation by blocking relitigation of any mat-
ters that overlap between the two actions. Second, a doctrine that
voids claim-splitting agreements unfairly penalizes the plaintiff and
gives the defendant a windfall when both parties appear equally cul-
pable. Third, this doctrine could chill parties from splitting claims
when such a split actually would be more just or more efficient. 2°°
In short, while the policy of judicial efficiency is important, judges
must not forget Professor Cleary's warning of long ago: "[I]f the
courts are too busy to decide cases fairly and on the merits, some-
thing is wrong." 20'
A court has yet to expressly invalidate an agreement to split a
claim. At least one court, however, has taken the similar step of ap-
plying issue preclusion against the clear intent of the parties in the
first action. In Aetna Casualty and Surety v. Jeppesen and Co.,202 the par-
ties settled during a bifurcated trial after the defendant had been
found liable, but before the trial on damages. 203 This settlement
declared the verdict stricken as if a new trial were granted.2°4 Nev-
ertheless, for purposes ofjudicial economy, the court allowed third
197 See Priest, supra note 52, at 535-36 (allocation of resources); Posner, supra note
30, at 998. In addition, preclusion sometimes benefits the judicial system by avoiding
the possibility of inconsistent judgments. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1,
§ 4403, at 12-13. But see supra note 46 (arguing that preclusion can also cause embaras-
sing inconsistencies).
198 These benefits may have motivated courts which, contrary to the express words
of Rule 8(c), apply res judicata sua sponte, or allow it to be pled for the first time on
appeal. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4405, nn.3-4 (collecting cases).
Sua sponte invocation of res judicata gives it status that is usually reserved solely for is-
sues of subject matterjurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). However, it is virtually
inconceivable that res judicata is properly elevated to that status, which would allow,
inter alia, collateral attacks on res judicata grounds.
199 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4415, at 124.
200 For instance, when a suit seeks both an immediate injunction and damages, par-
ties frequently agree to separate the claims so that the issues raised by the injunction
may be ruled upon as rapidly as possible. This occurred in United States v. Munsing-
wear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950), discussed infra note 208. Similarly, parties who have a series
of disputes arising out of similar circumstances may conduct a trial on one incident and
use the result as the basis for settlement negotiations.
201 Cleary, supra note 173, at 348.
202 440 F. Supp. 394 (D. Nev. 1977).
203 Id. at 398.
204 Id.
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parties to use the result as the basis for nonmutual issue preclusion
against the defendant.20 5
Aetna Casualty is extremely short-sighted for two reasons. First,
the settlement prevented the defendant from appealing the decision
on liability, thus rendering that verdict unfit for issue preclusion. 20 6
Second, by casting doubt on the validity of such agreements, the
court ensured that future litigants will be far more likely to try the
damages issues and then appeal, rather than settle with a provision
that the prior verdict be withdrawn. This is particularly true, as this
case shows, in an era when offensive, nonmutual issue preclusion
is allowed and can turn the loss of an insignificant case into a
catastrophe.
C. What Motivated the Drafters of the Second Restatement to
- Allow Unforeseeable Preclusion
Why did the drafters of the Second Restatement disapprove of is-
sue preclusion when the importance of the issue was unforeseeable,
and yet deliberately leave -open the possibility of equally unforesee-
able preclusion that results from novel exceptions to established
limitations? The arguments against unforeseeable preclusion could
not have been unknown to them, because the vast majority of cases
and articles cited in this Note were published prior to the final ap-
proval of the Second Restatement in 1980.207 In fact, on two occasions
the Second Restatement explicitly warns against unforeseeable preclu-
sion.208 It seems inconceivable that such a fundamental error could
have been made by such a distinguished group.
205 Id. at 405.
206 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28(1). For a discussion of the role of
the right to appeal in such cases, see Comment, ResJudicata and the Bifurcated Negligence
Trial, 16 UCLA L. REv. 203 (1968).
207 Indeed, two of the authors of Wright, Miller, & Cooper, served as Advisers 'to the
Reporters of the Second Restatement. See WRIGHiT, MILE.R & COOPER, supra note 1, § 4401,
at 6 & n.10.
208 The Reporter's Note to § 28(4) (dealing with a change in a burden of proof)
specifically disapproves of Harding v. Carr, 83 A.2d 79 (R.I. 1951), which states that a
shift in the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant (as opposed to an in-
crease in the level of proof from preponderance to dear and convincing) is irrelevant to
the application of issue preclusion. The decision to single out Harding for criticism is
odd given the statement in the comment to that section that "there may be many occa-
sions" that such changes should be disregarded. Indeed, a shift in the burden of proof
is a less drastic difference than a change in the level of proof. See supra part III.A.2.
The Second Restatement is more emphatic in warning about a trap involving cases that
have become moot. It is a well-established precept of res judicata law that issue preclu-
sion should not apply when "[tihe party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as
a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28(1). By its terms, this statement should apply to cases
in which an appeal is prevented because the underlying controversy has become moot.
However, in comment a to § 28, the following statement appears:
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The likely answer lies in the explanation given by Reporter
Benjamin Kaplan for replacing the First Restatement with a second:
"[T]he rules of res judicata are intimately connected with the style
of the procedural system. Therefore, when you pass from the older
mode of procedure to the Federal Rules system of procedure, there
must be compensating and corresponding changes in the law of res
judicata. ' 209 While this statement seems to explain the drafters' ac-
tions, it also provides insight into why the Second Restatement is pres-
ently flawed. Since 1980, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
changed in two key ways that undermine the assumptions of the
drafters of the Second Restatement and defeat their intentions.
The central concern of the drafters of the Second Restatement in
allowing unforeseeable preclusion is revealed in the deleted portion
of Tentative Draft No. 1: flexibility was allowed because "[i]n some
instances, it would be plainly unfair to subject the defendant to a
second action on the same claim because [the plaintiff could have]
avoid[ed] the burden of additional litigation. ' 210 There are three
tools at a judge's disposal to ameliorate this unfairness. First, he
can preclude. Second, if the plaintiff caused the prior suit to end on
an avoidable procedural problem that prevented a dedsion on the
merits, the court can sanction the plaintiff under Rule 11211 and
thereby compensate the defendant for his attorney's fees. Third, if
the second suit is so outlandish that no rational jury could find for
the plaintiff, he can grant summary judgment for the defendant
without going through a wasteful second trial. These latter two
remedies provide the judge with adequate tools to ensure both that
the defendant is not forced to bear the cost of two trials, and to
ensure that the plaintiff cannot impose multiple costs on the court
with impunity. Novel preclusion doctrines are simply unnecessary.
Note: With respect to controversies that have become moot, it is a proce-
dural requirement in some jurisdictions, in order to avoid the impact of
issue preclusion, that the appellate court reverse or vacate the judgment
below and remand with directions to dismiss.
Id § 28 cmt. a.
This warning was necessitated by the decision of the Supreme Court in United
States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950), in which the court adopted the above-
mentioned doctrine. There is no apparent purpose for the doctrine. First, it is patently
unfair to apply preclusion when there is no possibility of appellate review. Second, the
doctrine only requires that litigants take the mechanical step of requesting that the case
be remanded with instructions to vacate the prior judgment.
209 50 A.L.I. PRoc. 260 (1974). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, in-
troductory note, at 5-10 (discussing the relationship between procedure and
preclusion).
210 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48.1 cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1973).
211 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The pertinent portion of the text is reproduced supra at note
174.
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However, when the Second Restatement was adopted in 1980, the
situation was quite different. At that time, Rule 11 applied only
when the claim was brought in bad faith, and the Advisory Commit-
tee frankly admitted that "in practice [it] has not been effective in
deterring abuses. ' 212 This problem was corrected by the controver-
sial 1983 amendment to the rule.2 13 Similarly, prior to 1986, a
plaintiff could escape summary judgment by showing a "scintilla" of
evidence that supported his claim.214 Thus, preclusion was the only
way to avoid wasteful trial expenses, and since "[j]udges, over-
whelmed by docket loads, are looking for devices to expedite their
work," 2 15 tremendous pressure was placed on preclusion doctrine.
A 1986 trilogy of cases on summary judgment, however, rejected
the "scintilla" standard. These cases imposed a far easier test under
which the trial judge need only decide that no reasonable jury could
find for the defendant at trial, thereby making summary judgments
much more available.216
Therefore, the primary motivation for the drafters of these
rules no longer exists in federal court. These doctrines remain
wrong and unprincipled in jurisdictions that have not adopted these
reforms, and are all the more so given the additional tools judges
now have to avoid unjust burdens on defendants.
CONCLUSION
This Note does not argue against future expensions of res judi-
cata. Indeed, several of the doctrines criticized above could be ef-
fectively incorporated into the standard law of res judicata, so long
as they are applied consistently and with due notice to the liti-
gants.21 7 Similarly, this Note does not contend that courts have
212 FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 advisory committee's note.
213 97 F.R.D. 165, 167 (1983).
214 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHio ST. LJ. 95 (1988)
(collecting cases).
215 Alan Vestal, ResJudicata/Preclusion byJudgment: The Law Applied in Federal Court, 66
MICH. L. REv. 1723, 1724 (1968).
216 Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 547 (1986).
One commentator argues that these cases went so far as to make summary judgment
motions inquiries into the facts. See Stempel, supra note 214, at 163. The language of
these decisions, however, make quite clear that "[c]redibility determinations, the weigh-
ing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury func-
tions, not those of ajudge. . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255.
217 For example, a rule requiring amendment of a complaint to include new claims
as they accrue, see supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text, has some merit if it is
clearly stated and foreseeably applied. Similarly, it might be useful to develop prospec-
tively (perhaps as a Federal Rules Amendment), some form of nonmutual claim preclu-
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abused res judicata to give judgment to an undeserving party for no
apparent purpose. In each one of the cases outlined above, the
court had a good reason for ruling as it did. Either it sought to
introduce new efficiency into the law, or it sought to eliminate a case
from its docket because it already "knew" how the case should come
out, but could not grant summary judgment on the merits.
Rather, the problem is that these courts and the Second Restate-
ment ignore the fundamental need for resjudicata to be foreseeable,
and therefore underinclusive. While justice requires flexible excep-
tions to ensure that res judicata is not overinclusive, it is impossible
to design a system of res judicata in which preclusion is both fully
inclusive and foreseeable. This tension means that judges must
either endure a few trials they would rather avoid or adopt an un-
predictable system of flexible preclusion. Doctrines that result in
unforeseeable preclusion deprive litigants, who must be presumed
to have a compelling case, of an opportunity to be heard and cause
wasteful over litigation both of tangential matters and of preclusion
itself. At the same time, by definition, unforeseeable preclusion
cannot influence litigants to bring suits in efficient "packages" or to
have the confidence that creates reliance and repose. These benefits
derive from the expectation of preclusion, and expectation of un-
foreseeable preclusion is an oxymoron.
Indeed, unforeseeable preclusion serves only one purpose: to
spare one particular litigant the expense and aggravation of a trial.
What the Supreme Court said almost 75 years ago regarding the
need to avoid undue flexibility in blocking preclusion is equally ap-
plicable to undue flexibility in invoking it: "[W]e can not be ex-
pected, for [one litigant's] sole relief, to upset the general and well-
established doctrine of resjudicata.... [The mischief which would
follow the establishment of precedent for so disregarding [the rules
of res judicata] would be greater than the benefit of relieving some
case of individual hardship." 218
Robert Ziff t
sion to prevent litigants from avoiding nonmutual issue preclusion by suing different
targets under theories that have different standards of proof.
218 Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1932).
t The author would like to thank Professors Kevin Clermont and Robert Kent for
their invaluable help, and Rusty Wilson for his relentless persistence in ferreting out key
mistaken assumptions in earlier drafts.
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